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Measuring “Progress” and “Regress” in Human Rights: 
Why We Need a Set of Social Contract Measures to Replace Indices of Violations and 
Slogans 
 
 David Lempert1 
  
 
Abstract: This article presents a set of structural social contract measures that can be used as a 
basis for overall measurement of both the “progress” (or “regress”) of specific countries or cultures 
towards achieving the international standards of human rights as well as for promoting the success 
of specific human rights organizations in their interventions in the areas of human rights as a 
whole.  The current approaches to measures of human rights focus on a spotty set of outcomes:  
either numbers of human rights violations (symptoms of inequalities), subjective perceptions of 
rights and freedoms, conformity with or copying of particular institutions or laws in reference 
countries, and on particular socio-economic results to the detriment of others. Since none of the 
existing indicators today focus on the underlying structural processes of rights balancing and 
protections that come out of law and social contract theory in the form of positive rights (freedom 
to): oversight of powerful institutions, or equal opportunity for individual and community access 
to institutions and to resources, this article points the way to reorienting the measures. 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Several weeks ago, the upper management of one of the oldest and most prominent global 
human rights organizations, Amnesty International (AI), invited me for a meeting to discuss their 
strategy, monitoring and evaluation measures. AI originally began as a “watchdog” to note 
violations of individual political rights by countries and to promote campaigns to advocate for 
protection of individuals and groups. More recently, AI has recognized the importance of working 
on issues of human rights as a whole and on concentrating not only on “awareness” but also on 
human rights education and social change.  Indeed, AI recognizes that in many countries, including 
major industrialized countries that once claimed to be the leaders in promoting human rights, there 
has been a significant “rollback” or regress on civil liberties and social equality as well as in many 
other forms. Much of the organization’s work had shifted away from promoting progress on rights 
to simply stopping the flood of attacks on human rights and dismantling of rights protections that 
are now occurring on a global scale. 
What shocked me in that discussion and that has given rise to this article, is that despite several 
measures of quality of some of its technical inputs like “awareness raising” (social marketing) 
campaigns, AI, in fact, had no measures of overall progress or regress of countries or communities 
in human rights. Without such measures, it was and is unable to point to the speed and severity of 
                                                 
1 David Lempert, Ph.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (Hon.).  Dr. Lempert is a political anthropologist, California lawyer, and 
educator who has worked in more than 30 countries for the UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCHR, UNHCR, Amnesty 
International, the Soros Foundation, and several other organizations in the areas of human rights protections and 
international development.  He is founder and C.E.O. of Unseen America Projects, Inc., leading the design of 
democratic-experiential/clinical curricula, and of other rights initiatives including:  a monitor of donors and an 
initiative to create a Red Book for Endangered Human Cultures.  Among his innovations are 15 proposed amendments 
to the U.S. constitution (a work in three volumes) and model constitutions to establish closer citizen oversight and 
enforcement over public and private bureaucracies and to reaffirm political rights of ethnic groups. 
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global regress or to actually measure the organization’s real impact on human rights. Nor does any 
other organization appear to have such professional measures. 
Though there is a universal “outcome” standard for measuring protection of rights at one of 
the two levels of human rights – at the cultural/community level, measuring cultural viability and 
survival in a way that could give meaning to the international community’s law on criminalizing 
genocide, as opposed to the level of individual rights – AI does not even use that measure.  Nor 
does any other major human rights organization use this measure, though some smaller 
organizations and studies for UNESCO do at least recognize the approach.2 I have worked to 
standardize this outcome measure at the level of cultural rights, focusing on cultural health and 
viability. The approach is based on language survival as a litmus test for cultural rights and can be 
expanded using a “Red Book” approach for endangered cultures as a measure for 
cultural/community level rights outcomes.3 
At the level of individual rights, however, there is no overall standard set of measures that 
either defines an “outcome” of individual rights or that offers an indicator list of “structural” 
(legally enforceable) rights guarantees. While there are some global measures of “freedom” or 
“democracy” that have been used as proxies for human rights, the measures are spotty and many 
are subject to challenge for being politically or ideologically motivated. Often, they are just 
rankings rather than objective standards of measurable progress. Where they do look for evidence 
of specific kinds of institutional structures that could be related to rights protections, the underlying 
approach is often to serve interests of elites in creating spheres of influence and assimilating 
cultures to a set of complementary institutional forms, rather than to actually promote individual 
rights, themselves.4 
In short, despite histories that can date some 50 years like that of AI, human rights 
organizations have not designed any real measure or set of measures to use for their overall long-
term performance on individual rights or any category of rights. Though there is a general 
perception of equality and freedoms that is shared by those working in the rights community, there 
is no “Orwellian Index,” for example, to measure how close or far contemporary industrial 
countries may be towards the dark, dystopian totalitarian visions of Orwell’s 1984.5 Furthermore, 
nor is there even an agreed categorical list of requirements for structural legal rights protections in 
contemporary industrial societies. Organizational strategic plans and targets used by rights 
organizations like AI seem to change categories and priorities at whim. 
Human rights organizations today are essentially throwing money at “campaigns” and at 
ameliorating individual symptoms of structural political inequalities. They offer no systematic 
focus on the underlying system changes that would achieve progress in human rights. Note that 
this is not a criticism just of AI.  In fact, almost all organizations working in the human rights field 
create the impression that they are co-dependent on human rights violations to justify their mission 
and continued funding. It appears as if they have no real way to measure or to work towards long-
term impacts. This may be one of the reasons why it has also been easy for many of the violators 
                                                 
2 See Paris-Fontenoy, Language Vitality and Endangerment, UNESCO AD HOC EXPERT GROUP ON ENDANGERED 
LANGUAGES 1, 6 (Mar. 10-12, 2003); see also Michael Krauss, The World's Languages in Crisis Language, 68 
LANGUAGE 1, 6 (1992). 
3 See David Lempert, Why We Need a Cultural Red Book for Endangered Cultures, Now, INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF MINORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS (2010); http://david.dracula0.googlepages.com/home. 
4 See NOAM CHOMSKY AND EDWARD HERMAN, THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM 
(1979); see also TONY EVANS, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); see also SAVIC OBRAD, THE POLITICS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). 
5 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). 
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of human rights (governments and international organizations), themselves, to design so-called 
“human rights” projects that are little more than public relations window dressing or “rightswash,” 
and why human rights organizations often seek their money and blindly follow their set 
guidelines.6 
In an effort to professionalize the non-governmental sector and to hold both governments 
and NGOs accountable to scientific and professional standards and to international law, I began 
several years ago to build the infrastructure for measurement and oversight in international 
interventions.7 In recent articles, I have taken some of the initial steps to establish indicators and 
benchmarks through which the public and organizations can hold international development actors 
accountable to international law and to their mission statements for their interventions. These 
inexpensive and easy-to-use tools can create accountability and transparency in the use of public 
funds in development interventions. 
I have now published a series of 12+ indicators that will serve as a treatise on the law of 
international development, focusing on universal treaty definitions of development, sovereignty 
and areas of rights,8 along with ethics codes,9 in addition to measures and approaches in specific 
areas like cultural rights, as noted above. 
Moreover, this article presents a set of structural social contract measures to be used as a 
basis for overall measurement of both the “progress” (or “regress”) of specific countries or cultures 
towards achieving the international standards of human rights. These measures can then be used 
for promoting the success of specific human rights organizations in their interventions in the areas 
of human rights as a whole.   
Today, the current approaches to measures of human rights have failed. Current approaches 
focus on a spotty set of outcomes:  numbers of human rights violations (symptoms of inequalities); 
subjective perceptions of rights and freedoms; conformity with or copying of institutions or laws 
in reference countries and in particular, socio-economic results to the detriment of others. Since 
none of the existing indicators today focus on the underlying structural processes of rights 
balancing and protections that come out of law and social contract theory in the form of positive 
rights (freedom to): oversight of powerful institutions, equal opportunity for individual and 
community access to institutions and to resources, this article points the way to reorienting the 
measures. 
As such, this article begins with professionally recognized and universally legislated 
standards for defining and listing areas of human rights, in structurally enforceable social contract 
forms, universal aspirations for outcomes and social science tests of what is possible. These 
standards form the basic set of potential structural and outcome measures. 
 
                                                 
6 See David Lempert, A ‘Democracy Building’ Development Project Indicator for NGOs and International 
Organizations, 11 GLOBAL JURIST 2 (2011); see also David Lempert, A Human Rights Education Project 
Indicator for NGOs and International Organizations, 3 INTERAMERICAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY 
1 (2010).   
7 See David Lempert, Why We Need an International Development Donor Monitor, POLICY 
INNOVATIONS (Jan. 2008), http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policylibrary/data/01464. 
8 See David Lempert, A Dependency in Development Indicator for NGOs and International Organizations, 9 
GLOBAL JURIST 2 (2009).  
9 See David Lempert, Holding the Powers that Be Accountable to Our Ethics Code to Protect Our Integrity and the 
Peoples We Serve, 24 HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1997).  
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This piece then explains how the debate on the politicization of rights in the era of 
globalization has diverted attention from structurally enforceable social contract forms in a way 
that has undermined the earlier legal consensus on human rights, and that has undermined effective 
measurement.  In fact, an examination of existing measurement approaches shows how these 
approaches fail to link coherently with the set of professionally recognized and universally 
legislated standards for human rights.  
Accordingly, this piece then proposes a measurement framework of structurally 
enforceable social contract forms for balancing power in key areas that are essential to achieving 
the full set of rights protections, as well as for achieving existing and potential outcome measures. 
 
B. The Theory of Measuring Human Rights  
 
Today, one often hears from academics about the lack of agreement as to  how to define 
human rights, and that human rights are culturally specific, that the ideas of universals are a myth 
and that it is difficult to even try to measure human rights.10 Much of that discourse may be a result 
of the politicization and distortion of rights discourse by elites who do not wish to be held to 
international standards or who believe that they can advance their careers by supporting such 
distortions in ways  that are at odds with protecting and promoting rights. In fact, there is a standard 
definition of rights. There is also a solid core of approaches for which to define and list areas of 
human rights, grounded in specific professional disciplines, which complement and reinforce each 
other. There are also professionally recognized and universally legislated standards for defining 
and listing categories of human rights: in structurally enforceable social contract forms and 
universal aspirations for outcomes. There are also social science tests of what is possible. These 
all form the basic set of potential structural and outcome measures. 
 
A Definition of Human Rights and its Elements 
 
There is a definition of human rights that comes out of centuries of legal tradition in 
complex societies.  In fact, the same definition is used by the international community in its 
universal consensus. Where there is confusion today, it is often the result of academics and 
practitioners creating new definitions, and then claiming that by these new definitions, such rights 
are intangible or disputed.   
In Anglo American jurisprudence, the textbook definition of a “right,” dating back some 
250 years, is that of a contractual term noting an agreement between parties for which there exists 
an institutional structure for enforcement and a remedy for its failure or breach.11 Human rights 
then, are those rights created in a “social contract” that establishes how individuals (at the level of 
individuals) and communities/cultures (at the level of communities and/or cultures) interact with 
each other to be governed and to resolve disputes.12 
In establishing the universality of these human rights, the United Nations recognizes the 
same element of legal enforceability that is the basis of contract, established by individuals and 
groups with each other. As such, “[h]uman rights are universal legal guarantees protecting 
                                                 
10 See Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY S83 – S95 (2011). 
11 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-69). 
12 See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (1762). 
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individuals and groups against actions and omissions that interfere with fundamental freedoms, 
entitlements and human dignity.”13 
The idea is that these rights are “natural” beliefs embedded in human nature and human 
interactions in ways that are universal, as this is now being confirmed in studies of children across 
cultures in their understandings of fairness and reciprocity. There is a biological (neural, cognitive) 
basis for human understanding of equity and fairness in relations.14 Though cultures shape this to 
fit different environments, the natural concepts of fairness and “rights” are universal prior to being 
shaped by (the various forms of “social contract” that are specific to each) culture in the context 
of specific environments. 
The source of current confusion in the definition of human rights is a result of the 
shortening and over simplification which sometimes omits references to law. The 18th century 
legal doctrines in Anglo American law described by Blackstone, and the continental law reflected 
in Rousseau’s discussion of social contract, both presented above, must be taken together. Human 
rights are fulfilled through a “social contract” and contract, by definition, includes the elements of 
institutional processes for enforcement and remedies. By contrast, the meaning is less clearly stated 
in the current U.N. definition of human rights, cited above. Nevertheless, there is ample proof that 
the U.N. definition, in calling for “legal guarantees,” is implying the requirement of “institutional 
processes for enforcement and remedies” even without finding the word “social contract.” 
Although the U.N. definition does not incorporate legal terms, when the U.N. offers ways 
of measuring rights, it specifically mentions “structural, process, and outcome” measures that are 
rooted in law.15 Such “structures” include both legal institutions and laws established through 
agreement, with processes to carry them out to achieve the outcomes. These are the elements of 
contract, agreement and enforcement. Where “rights holders” are individuals, the contracts are a 
social contract. 
Today, academic criticisms of the universality of human rights regimes claim that they are 
rooted in Western tradition and legal systems (whose history is that of the Roman and Greek 
Empires as well as earlier legal traditions of the ancient Near East), and that this creates cultural 
biases that makes human rights ambiguous and unknowable. The basis of this critique is a 
misunderstanding. The universality of human rights regimes is based on the concept of social 
contract and the protections of parties to each social contract, in the same way that laws protect 
the rights of individuals to contract relations with each other. The outcomes of these social 
contracts can potentially take an infinite number of forms while adhering to these basic principles. 
However, these forms must not be held to a single, universal standard. Accordingly then, it is in 
trying to enforce uniformity on political, economic and social systems are where those who claim 
to support “universal” rights are at fault, and additionally, where the idea of “universality” is 
misstated. Thus, the problem in human rights practice does not involve the bedrock definitions. 
Instead, the problem is in the abuses of current measurements and current international 
interventions in the name of rights.    
Both the history of social contract and the universal consensus on human rights in 
international law recognize and protect two distinct levels of rights; one of them at the level of 
cultures/communities. International human rights law protects indigenous approaches to legal 
                                                 
13 Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation 10 (2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf.  
14 See DONALD W. PFAFF, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF FAIR PLAY: WHY WE (USUALLY) FOLLOW THE GOLDEN RULE 
(2007). 
15 See supra note 13, at 35. 
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systems and to definitions of individual rights through the legally enforceable U.N. Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”).16 Social 
contract traditions recognize these rights in “federalism” protections to balance cultural rights, 
such as those in the United States Constitution as negotiated among “states” with specific cultural 
traditions and geographies.17 
The fear that the concepts of “social contract” are themselves culturally biased is circular 
reasoning. Such concepts simply seek to eliminate even the basic definition of “rights” and to 
eliminate the basis for any agreement at all. Indeed, the reality today among industrial and 
industrializing countries is that their legal systems, from Africa to Asia to South America, largely 
embody Western legal traditions and concepts. These legal traditions and concepts date back to 
centuries of imperialism, cultural diffusion and modern convergence, and are now mixed with 
many other traditions and systems in different environments. Nevertheless, this history of contact 
of cultures offers the basis for cultures to meet with each other and to accept a basic definition as 
the starting point for then discussing this concept of rights in its multiple applications. 
To fully understand the concept of rights within the framework of this definition requires 
moving from the abstract to the practical. Because the definition of rights implies an agreement in 
the form social contract, fulfilling specific legal elements, there are specific examples that date 
back to the history of the term more than 200 years ago. 
Two examples of how human rights meet the full legal definition of enforceability through 
the inclusion of three specific rights elements – (a) social contract (the structural element) denoting 
a categorical right, (b) procedural elements for enforcing those rights, with remedies to assure 
balances of power, and (c) outcomes (measurable results demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
protection) – are described in Table 1, below, with one example from each of the two levels of 
rights (cultural/community and individual).  Both rights are taken from the United States Bill of 
Rights dating back to 1789 (also shown more fully in Table 2 below). The first example of a 
community or collective right, is taken from the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and the second, an example, of an “individual right,” is taken from the Seventh 
Amendment. However, neither of these specific rights are yet to exist in international treaty 
documents, as treaties do not state actual mechanisms for rights to exist but only aspirations for 
those rights. Both the right to sovereignty for communities (and the linked right to life and security) 
and the right to legal remedies and due process for the protection of individual political (and social) 
rights are enshrined in international treaties, such as the International Declaration of Human Rights 
in Articles 3, 6, and 8; the Genocide Convention; Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and Article 16 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (see Table 3, below).18 
                                                 
16 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx.  
17 See U.S. CONST.; see also DAVID LEMPERT, THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY, A RETURN TO DEMOCRACY: THE 
MODERN DEMOCRACY AMENDMENTS, A RETURN TO COMMUNITY: THE NEW FEDERALIST AMENDMENTS 
(unpublished trilogies). 
18 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, (Dec. 10, 1948), http://www.un-
documents.net/a3r217a.htm; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), (Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx; see also International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx; see also Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx. 
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Table 1 (A).  Examples of Human Rights and Their Elements, by Definition 
 
Human Right (and 
Category) 
Structure (Social 
Contract) 
Process Outcome 
Cultural/Community Right 
Right to a local 
militia (Right to 
sovereignty of a 
cultural group and 
the Right to life and 
security) 
[From the U.S. 
Constitution, Bill of 
Rights, Amendment 
II.] 
Political 
autonomy with 
recognized local 
structures 
including a 
military for 
defense and 
security. 
National and 
international level 
balancing of 
military, national 
security and 
police powers to 
reduce tensions 
and military 
spending and to 
promote equity. 
Integrity of cultures 
and communities in 
all of their political, 
economic and social 
spheres, free of 
pressure and 
assimilation or other 
form of cultural 
genocide and an 
equitable balance of 
military powers 
among 
cultures/communities. 
Individual Right 
Right to a civil jury 
in a civil court case 
(Right to legal 
remedies, requiring 
due process right to 
an impartial body) 
[From the U.S. 
Constitution, Bill of 
Rights, Amendment 
VII.] 
Individual 
autonomy as both 
a legal actor in 
bringing actions 
and participating 
in judging them 
through the 
recognized 
structure of an 
empowered jury. 
Appropriate 
funding for and 
protection of 
jurors as well as 
limiting the 
procedural power 
of State judges. 
Social and political 
equality as well as 
other rights 
protections of 
workers. 
 
 
Generating the Universal Sets of Human Rights Structures and Outcomes, Both Theoretical and 
Possible   
 
There are 3 core social scientific approaches for generating a universal set of human rights 
structures and outcomes that work to complement each other and to verify a set of outcomes. The 
first approach (the axiomatic, inductive approach) starts in political theory, and begins with a 
concept that individuals and cultures are both independent.  This approach then works inductively 
to construct a social contract that all parties would view as “fair,” “just” and “equitable,” without 
knowing their initial starting point endowments of wealth and power compared to other individuals 
and groups. 
A second approach (a cross cultural inductive research approach into human aspirations 
for “development” and “rights”) works cross culturally to identify the universal and common 
aspirations of individuals and cultures in two independent but interrelated steps. One step is to 
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determine the opportunities that individuals and cultures would seek (that political scientists 
identify as “positive liberty” or “freedom to” and that other social scientists refer to as 
“development goals” for human development).  The next step would determine what protections 
individuals and cultures would need (“negative liberty” or “freedom from”) in the form of “rights” 
and “resources” to achieve these goals.  These goals are now established universally in 
international treaties, although there are some imperfections and contradictions that can, at least 
theoretically, be resolved. This approach is also inductive but starts with data collection as well as 
with actual international negotiations of treaties. 
The third approach (a deductive, empirical approach to human rights based on the 
determinative factors for and constraints on what is possible) is rooted in anthropology.  It starts 
with the theoretical ideals and stated aspirations, above, and examines empirically what is possible 
given the human record of societies in different historical environments, the balances of power and 
“rights” that exist in these conditions, and how they change. This deductive, social science 
approach can determine what is possible and how constraints on social relations operate. 
Furthermore, these scientific approaches establish rights on objective grounds. Instead of 
human rights being viewed merely as codes of “moral” or “religious” views and aspirations, the 
social science approaches distinguish them from religious invocations. They can, instead, be 
recognized as principles of balancing power and creating consensus in ways that offer long-term 
benefits for human survival through protection of human cultural and individual diversity. Indeed, 
there is now increasing recognition that societies that protect human cultural and individual 
diversity are those that are most adaptive and resilient with the greatest potential for promoting 
human integration with changing environments for human survival. That means that the social 
science of “human rights” ultimately works as a set of mechanisms to promote human survival in 
ways that may be directly measurable. 
Social science is, admittedly, imperfect at the level of societies, because it is not possible 
to run controlled experiments and there is a limited amount of observed data that is always being 
supplemented slowly, with new cases. Nevertheless, social scientists have developed methods of 
“thought experiments” and testing of theories using axioms that can be used in parallel with, and 
as a test of actual data, in ways that confirm the different approaches. In this way, these three social 
science approaches do offer the basic “science” of human rights. Controversies may develop where 
political preferences seek to replace efforts at culturally neutral, objective tests and where data is 
only partial, but these problems are always inherent in social sciences (and in natural science). 
They are simply challenges to improve measures and predictions.   
 
These three social science approaches, setting the groundwork for measures of progress (or 
regress) on human rights, can be explained in greater detail as follows: 
 
(1)  The Axiomatic, Inductive, Political Theory and Social Contract Approach to Human Rights   
 
One aspect of social science modeling has been to start with assumptions about humans in 
the “state of nature” and then to derive “ideal” systems on this basis. However, this approach has 
imperfections.  Admittedly, economics has long been faulted for making assumptions about the 
“rational economic actor” that are based on economic greed, that has led to the discipline creating 
models of consumption, production and exploitation that are far from the human ideal and human 
reality. By contrast, some of the starting assumptions of political theory were more firmly based 
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on actual behaviors and innate beliefs on justice,19 that have led to the building of theories of 
contract and social contract. 
 
The starting assumptions for “human rights” are based on the “Golden Rule” that is a 
universal human concept (“Do unto others as you would have others do unto you”). This is, in fact, 
a mathematical principle or axiom of “symmetry” and “transitivity” that is the basis of human 
rights concepts.20 
Political philosophers like John Rawls have developed theories of “justice” through 
inductive thought experiments, asking individuals to assume an “original starting position” in 
which they are contracting with others to build a society that they view as “fair” and meeting their 
needs.21 Instead of starting with their current social status, wealth, and advantages or 
disadvantages, the thought experiments begin with the assumption of a “veil of ignorance,” where 
individuals imagine that their initial advantages will all be random and that the risks they would 
face in life would also be random. From this “ex ante” position, individuals determine the types of 
relative powers and protections they would need to best protect their own long-term benefits both 
as individuals and as members of cultures/communities. The result is to derive the ideal “social 
contract” that political philosophers also envisioned.22 
The problem with this social contract theory is that it has been difficult for political 
philosophers to actually move from these abstract concepts to the design of a universal social 
contract that could easily be adapted to different societies. Most people cannot really think through 
an entire system and how it should work. In fact, few citizens (or scholars) are trained in law and 
in public administration or management skills and in the psychology of information processing 
and decision-making, that are all relevant to institutional oversight, transparency, political equality 
and rights protections. Still, even fewer think of abstract problems like building a workable utopia. 
Instead, individuals are more likely are preoccupied with their next meal and next job. Thus, the 
idea of moving from the “state of nature” to an actual working system has also been viewed as 
abstract and unrealistic, since few societies start from scratch and from positions of relative 
equality, where observers could see this social experiment at work. 
However, there exists an example of such a system. After the independence of the 
American colonies from Britain in 1776, they set about trying to establish a government that would 
balance 13 different colonies that each had different cultural origins (several British but also 
German, Dutch, Swedish and French, as well as nearby Spanish and Native American territories), 
as well as different economies and traditions.  At the individual level, while there were large racial 
and gender inequalities, the basic economic and political unit throughout all of these former 
colonies was the independent, male headed household. These household units, with the political 
rights held by the male head, were also the independent social contractors who sought to protect 
and balance their interests. 
In fact, they did negotiate various social contracts. Their first effort (The Articles of 
Confederation) failed.  The second effort was not accepted until several compromises that 
recognized autonomous powers of communities and cultures (i.e. communities and “states”) as 
well as individual rights in the form of a second attached document to “The Constitution of These 
                                                 
19 See supra note 14. 
20 See WALTER T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS (1937); see also WILLIAM E. PADEN, INTERPRETING THE 
SACRED: WAYS OF VIEWING RELIGION 131–32 (2003). 
21 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
22 See supra note 12. 
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United States.” The finally agreed upon initial contract included a “Bill of Rights” proposed by 
the “Anti-Federalists” who contracted for several representative mechanisms (like militias and 
juries) as part of the contract.23 
Using the tools that exist today for public administration, managerial oversight, 
communications, psychology, decision science and law, one can recognize all the specific 
mechanisms of balance and oversight in the U.S. Constitution and in its cultural context. One can 
also see how industrialization and technological change has reoriented almost every one of these 
balances and weakened all of the original control systems. The corporation, the national security 
state and the national military are all new, and there has never been a renegotiation of the social 
contract in the United States or an unpressured negotiation among relatively equal actors 
establishing such a social contract anywhere else.24 
Social contract principles can, however, inductively be transferred to imagine an ideal 
social contract for oversight and control of these organizations as well as for new balances of 
power in contexts like those of today. One would need to imagine direct mechanisms of citizen 
oversight and control in several forms, including inspection bodies of representative citizens with 
independent judicial powers, as forms of participatory democracy to assure meaningful “human 
rights” in modern societies. 
I have pioneered exactly such a theoretical, inductive, model ideal, using the principles of 
the original U.S. Constitution’s social contract and translating them to modern societies both for a 
revised form of federalism, to balance cultural and community rights, and individual rights 
balancing.25 Some of these principles for the individual rights are highlighted in short pieces26 as 
well as in models for individual rights protection in newly “independent” states like Ukraine.27  
 
(2) The Cross-Cultural, Inductive Research Approach into Universal Human Aspirations for 
“Development” and Human Rights 
 
The process of generating a list of cross-cultural universal aspirations for “development” 
and for “human rights” has already taken place, but not in the work of social scientists. 
Nevertheless, such a process can be confirmed by social science.  It has occurred in international 
negotiations among nation-state leaders, starting in 1945 at the end of World War II, and continued 
since then. The body of international treaties now offers a consensus of “universal” aspirations, 
with many of them referred to as “rights” even though they do not meet all of the elements of the 
definition of “rights” that the U.N. itself recognizes. Certainly, the negotiating bodies to 
international agreements are some nearly 200 nation states and they are not fully representative of 
the globe’s 6,000 human cultures and peoples. Nevertheless, these nearly 200 states that cover the 
globe are diverse and have reached an agreement on these lists. The goal of these lists fits into the 
framework of the United Nations and its mandate following World War II: to provide a system of 
global peace and security for long term human survival and benefit.   
                                                 
23 See U.S. CONST.; see also BRUTUS, To the Citizens of the State of New York in THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 1787 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., 2008). 
24  See Lempert, supra note 17. 
25 Id. 
26 See David Lempert, Development and Constitutional Democracy: A Set of Principles for 'Perfecting the 
Market, 36 THE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPING SOCIETIES 1 (1996). 
27 See David Lempert, Ukraine's New Constitution: Continuity Under the Banner of Change with a Proposal for 
Authoritarian to Democratic Transitions, 2 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 2 (1994). 
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Overall, there are some disagreements as to the exact universal core of human rights 
treaties, which is why an approach (described below) of trying to define categories and boundaries 
of aspirations may be a key to identifying areas of rights to be measured. Indeed, the total number 
of international declarations continues to increase with individual groups of rights holders and, 
now, groups of rights practitioners and/or economic producers and government sectors, each 
advocating for recognition in an international agreement. Some of the existing treaties are legally 
enforceable, such as the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court that defines crimes against humanity.28 Other treaties are not internationally enforceable on 
nation states and they were passed at different times. Some of their principles are then elaborated 
in “declarations” that are considered less “binding.” The wording is not always consistent from 
one treaty to the next, though they are mostly reinforcing and overlapping. There are also slightly 
different lists of signatories to each. 
Among the central core human rights treaties are the International Declaration of Human 
Rights (“IDHR”) and two follow-up treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”).29 Generally, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) are 
also considered with these.30 Occasionally, the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Convention 
(IV) on International Humanitarian Law applicable to the treatment of civilians during times of 
war are additionally considered along with these.31 Finally, the U.N. Charter is also considered to 
be in the same category among these mentioned above.32 
It is a judgment call on where to place the U.N. Declarations that include the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development that appears to create rights for sustainable development and choice of 
consumption patterns to protect it.33 
                                                 
28 See supra note 16; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Jul. 17, 1998). 
29 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, (Dec. 10, 1948), http://www.un-
documents.net/a3r217a.htm; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), (Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx; see also International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx; see also Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx. 
30 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA 44/25, (Nov. 20, 1989), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx; see also Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. 
31 See Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE RED CROSS (Aug. 12, 1949), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&action=op
enDocument. 
32 See United Nations Charter. 59 Stat. 1031. (Jun. 26, 1945). 
33 See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 15, 
2007); http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf; see also U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Dec. 8, 1992), 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm; see also Report on the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Jun. 3-4, 1992), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1annex1.htm.  
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Given the overlaps in how international treaties present “rights,” and the fact that not all of 
the “rights” contain all of the elements meeting the definition of “rights,” it makes sense to list 
them first as “aspirations,” and then to see how they fit with the definition for various elements of 
“rights.” 
Many international treaties on rights specifically mention “human rights” that can be 
placed onto a list of such rights, but not all of them do. At the same time, many of these treaties 
also mention general aspirations that are indistinguishable from “human rights” or that are now 
viewed as “rights.” These are defined using the term, “development,” even though there is no 
Convention on development; only the Declaration on Environment and Development, which 
appeared decades later in 1992.34   
Since the international agreements on human rights do not define any social contract 
provisions that would make rights enforceable and that would establish power balances, the best 
way to view these treaties are as lists of universal “aspirations,” even though they may or may not 
be labeled as “rights.” Such aspirations fall into two types. One is the list of the opportunities that 
individuals and cultures would seek (that political scientists identify as “positive liberty” or 
“freedom to”) that are really the subcategories of universal goals for “development.” The other is 
the list of protections that individuals and cultures would need (“negative liberty” or “freedom 
from”) in the form of “rights” and “resources” to achieve these goals.  Since both are two sides of 
the same coin, they can also be used to validate each other and to solidify the list of international 
human rights while presenting their elements. If there is a universal aspiration for development, 
there needs to be a corresponding legal basis either in power and/or protection that would make it 
an enforceable part of social contract to meet the definition of “rights.” Social science can work 
with these treaties to confirm and solidify these lists and then to work towards systematic measures 
of progress towards achieving them. 
In fact, a previous article of mine began this process. I used the existing international 
treaties that list “human rights” as well as those that also reference “development” as the basis for 
deriving the international consensus aspirations of “development,” and placed them in a unified 
framework of “Universal Development Goals.”35 Several different treaties and declarations that 
are nearly universal (signed by most, but not all country members of the United Nations) contain 
the same “development” wording alongside wording for rights. These can be used to derive a list 
of all areas of development where there is agreement. In fact, there are 13 identifiable “universal 
development goals” in the treaties, at four different levels (individual, community, between 
communities/cultures, and internationally). These are presented later in this article (in Table 4) in 
a comparison of the “development goals” and “human rights” to show where the list of human 
rights has left some gaps that are needed to fulfill development goals, and how both sets can be 
used together in creating measures of progress or regress.   
Indeed, the list of rights can also be better categorized in order to make them easier to 
measure and to reflect categories derived inductively and axiomatically in defining social contract 
(the first approach, above). I believe that there are a number of identifiable rights categories for 
                                                 
34 See Report on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Jun. 3-4, 1992), 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.  
35 See David Lempert, Universal Development Goals for this Millennium, 12  CONSILIENCE (2014); see also 
David Lempert, A Vision for International Development and a Tool for Comparisons, 16 JOURNAL FOR 
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (2014).     
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power balancing and oversight through social contract at the level of individual rights protections 
and at the level of cultural rights protections (federalism), in addition to corresponding outcome 
measures that are roughly 20 in number (not exact because some of them cross categories). These 
are presented in later sections of this paper (Tables 6 and 7). This is an antidote to the continued 
expansion of rights agreements with a seemingly infinite number of aspirations. As such, it 
establishes a bounded framework, though there may be a changing number of sub-categories as 
social complexity and technologies transform the context of power relations and opportunities. 
 
(3) An Empirical, Deductive Approach to Human Rights based on What is Sustainable and 
Possible 
 
The least developed aspects of the social science of human rights are the studies of which 
rights are possible in different societies and the studies of how the existence of specific rights 
influences human well-being as well as long-term cultural survival and sustainability. There are 
two extreme assumptions relating to how different approaches to human rights appear in different 
societies and on whether and how change may occur. Proponents of both assumptions seem to 
prevent social scientists from testing either one. One belief is that political and social systems, 
including human rights systems, invoke a meaning of free political choice that people of a society 
can make at any time. However, this belief defies social science reality, entirely.  
The other belief is that cultural choices are predetermined by environmental, geographic 
and technological factors, and that no free choice is possible at all.  The implication of this 
assumption is that current systems, whether outsiders view them as “violations” of rights 
principles, can only be changed by outside influences and interventions which themselves would 
be a violation of rights. Thus, both of these positions make it difficult to measure progress on 
human rights. They interfere with an understanding of what may or may not be culturally 
appropriate and sustainable without an understanding of the pathways to achieving such. 
Meanwhile, there seems to be social science evidence to demonstrate that systems where there is 
the greatest expression of social contract rights, as evidenced by diversity of cultural approaches 
and individual freedoms, along with mechanisms for achieving consensus, are the most adaptable, 
stable and productive. Nevertheless, there are also counterexamples and arguments about this 
relationship, such as the stability and survival of the Han Chinese culture even without many 
aspects of social contract rights. 
Political science assumes, without testing or questioning, that systems of free will in the 
choice of political and legal systems are an independent variable. The discipline has catalogued 
comparative rights regimes but because it starts with this fixed assumption it has not developed 
theories of predicting how and why different regimes arise other than through hegemonic 
influences that force client states (weaker, subordinate, dependent, or “satellite” countries”) to 
conform to certain structures. Though the discipline recognizes that imposed legal and political 
systems and rights regimes may or may not result in actual “rights” changes, depending upon 
whether the essential “deep structure” of the culture (technology, relations with the environment, 
and approaches to economic and social needs) is also changed, it has not pursued this further.36 
                                                 
36 By contrast, the discipline of Anthropology originally began with the assumption that cultures are products of 
their environment and political/legal systems are driven from environmental factors. Often linked with this 
assumption is the belief that these systems should not be changed, and their current inequalities should remain, even 
if such cultures and societies are not sustainable.  Recently, however, the prediction of systems that arise in various 
environments and with different technologies, along with the study of how and whether systems can change on their 
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In efforts to promote this area of inquiry, I have also completed some comparative research 
and modeling in this field in predicting political systems and “federal” systems.37 So far, these 
results suggest that there is limited opportunity for cultures to change, since their forms are largely 
determined. Thus, it appears that societies are likely to collapse before they are likely to change 
their political and legal institutions, since these are fundamental aspects of their cultures that resist 
change. To understand the basic concepts, one can think of industrial societies over the past 
century. In contemporary societies, there appears to be a high correlation between the existence of 
a middle class and social contract rights and political equality, reflecting this distribution of 
economic power. At the same time, there is also a correlation between technologies, industry and 
resources with the existence of a middle class. Where there are more highly concentrated resources 
or technologies, and where productivity depends on this concentration, there is concentrated 
economic power with little political equality. Similarly, when there are dispersed resources, 
dispersed means of production (production technologies) and little chance or need for industry to 
be concentrated, there is dispersed economic power. Additionally, there is also dispersed political 
equality through social contract rights. 
In both the early agrarian United States where households owned their means of production 
and in the 1960s, where education allowed individuals to open their own medical clinics, law firms 
and small businesses to compete in non-concentrated industries, there were forms of social contract 
democracy with a distribution of political rights among those who represented the units of 
production. By contrast, where technologies and the resources needed for those technologies are 
costly or concentrated, economic control has become concentrated and social contract rights have 
become limited.  In many countries, today, where militaries control resources that are the key to 
the economy, or where there are few and concentrated industries (that seek the military to protect 
them), there is a direct correlation with political inequality and a weakening of human rights. 
Although one can imagine systems that disperse oversight and power, it is difficult to see how that 
could come about given empirical historical data on political systems and on pathways of change. 
Nevertheless, interventions would protect many cultures where there are high 
concentrations of power and little in the way of social contract rights, against internal violence and 
collapse if there were ways to work with cultures to do so. The pathways to establishing sustainable 
cultures and appropriate rights systems – without undermining traditional cultural aspects and 
restoring aspects of the cultures that may have once been sustainable – is not easy. This is why 
much of the focus on “promoting human rights” today seems to focus on destroying cultures and 
                                                 
own, have been eliminated from the discipline. The approaches have been replaced only with the “moral” belief that 
cultures should not be urged to change (even if change might protect them from collapse) other than to copy certain 
forms found in industrial countries, like political rights for women. Meanwhile, the discipline has also eliminated 
scientific hypothesis testing in examination of contemporary societies. The only examination of these questions 
remains in “political anthropology” which has traditionally been part of archaeology. That subfield’s approach has 
largely been to tell stories about the evolution of complex society but without any predictions of how and where 
different systems of rights could arise or change. See DAVID LEMPERT, PREDICTING POLITICAL SYSTEMS USING 
ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND RELATIONAL VARIABLES, SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND HISTORY (2016); see also 
David Lempert, The Myth of Social Progress, Revisited, 5 HUMAN FIGURATIONS: LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES 1, 
(Mar. 2016); see also David Lempert, Classifying Cultures by Their Relations in Groups: Drawing from Models in 
Psychology and Ecology, 13 SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND HISTORY 1, 99-134 (Mar. 2014). 
37 Id.  
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absorbing them into a global, industrial system in ways that actually undermine cultural rights in 
the name of rights.38 
 
Linking the Three Social Science Approaches 
 
The three social science approaches to identification of human rights can be viewed as 
conceptually linked for the purposes of defining and identifying rights, as well as for their 
measurement.   
 
- The universal aspirations for development and for rights to protect such development (the 
second method, above) can be viewed as the “outcome” goals of human rights. These 
aspirations offer the basis for measuring “outcomes.”   
- The ideal social contract forms for balancing power in ways to achieve those aspirations (the 
first method, above) can be viewed as the “structural procedures” for achieving human rights 
goals. These can be potentially measured by “structural social contract” indicators. 
- The potential limits to what is possible within the environments where these outcomes are 
sought (the third method, above), raises questions about whether human rights changes are 
possible or at least to what extent and by what mechanisms. This sets the framework for human 
rights actions and for measuring the value and success of such actions. 
 
Therefore, no human rights system can have any impact unless it considers all three of these 
approaches together, since rights are both their legal structures and their effective outcomes, placed 
in their social and cultural context. 
Table 1B takes the same two examples of human rights that were introduced in Table 1A and 
examines them again in terms of these three approaches as a prelude to creating measurement 
categories for rights. What is interesting to see here in Table 1B is that there seem to be some clear 
recognition of aspirations in development in international treaties, but the list of rights still only 
partly matches development aspirations. The structural mechanisms that were clearly stated to 
achieve these goals in a basic international rights document like the U.S. Bill of Rights more than 
two centuries ago, do not appear in treaties. Moreover, these two specific rights, though key to 
achieving international aspirations, also seem to have disappeared from the international human 
rights system even though they are part of the historical basis for concepts of human rights. 
Furthermore, there are now questions as to whether the achievement of these two historic and 
fundamental areas of rights are even possible in contemporary state systems! 
This structuring of the analysis of human rights now offers a basis for creating appropriate 
measurement systems for a list of basic rights. At the same time, it offers a basis for demonstrating 
how the current international approach to human rights is in fact undermining the possibilities for 
appropriate measurements. 
                                                 
38 See Lempert, A Human Rights Education Project Indicator,  supra note 6. 
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Table 1 (B).  Examples of Human Rights as Derived by Different Social Science Approaches 
 
International Legal Consensus in 
Treaties (Approach 2) 
Structure 
(Social 
Contract) 
(Approach 1) 
Constraints and 
Limitations 
(Approach 3) Universal 
Development Goal 
Human Right 
(and Category) 
Cultural/Community Right 
Global Development 
Goals (11 and 12): 
Social Equity of 
Cultures; 
Political 
Equity/Equal  rights 
for Cultures 
 
 
Right to 
sovereignty of a 
cultural group 
(ICCPR; 
ICESCR). 
Right to life and 
security (IDHR).  
Integrity of 
cultures and 
communities in all 
of their political, 
economic and 
social spheres, free 
of pressure and 
assimilation or 
other form of 
cultural genocide 
(Genocide 
Convention). 
Right to a local 
militia. 
Political 
autonomy with 
recognized local 
structures 
including a 
military for 
defense and 
security.  
No State Member of the 
U.N. seems willing to 
allow this right unless 
the state formed as a 
result of different 
groups with militaries 
coming together.  Even 
when they do, balance 
seems to be the 
exception to the rule 
with one side ultimately 
assimilating or 
eliminating the other 
following civil war.  
This right in the U.S. 
has disappeared. 
Individual Right 
Societal Level 
Development Goals 
(7 and 8): 
Social Equity and 
Equal Opportunity; 
Political 
Equity/Equal Rights 
 
 
Right to legal 
remedies (IDHR, 
ICCPR).  
However, due 
process in civil 
trials and civil 
juries are not even 
recognized in 
international 
treaties, nor is 
equality in the 
courts.  
Right to a civil 
jury in a civil 
court case. 
Individual 
autonomy as both 
a legal actor in 
bringing actions 
and participating 
in judging them.  
Where this right 
originally existed, such 
as in the U.S., it has 
been whittled away with 
jury powers now limited 
by judges, low salaries 
for jurors and high costs 
to request a civil jury, as 
well as limiting laws 
using juries.  
Inequalities here reflect 
the inequalities in the 
society of corporate 
wealth. 
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C. The International Community’s Recent Ideological Transformation of the Definition 
of Human Rights and Implications and How This Has Undermined Measurement  
           
While there is a social science approach towards identifying human rights and their various 
elements, there has been a failure to generate a clear list of these rights with their key elements. 
Additionally, there has been a failure to link the list of rights with real measures. There is a simple 
reason why this systematization of human rights into clear categories has yet to occur and remains 
a subject of confusion.  It is because the international system, in claiming to be in promotion of 
human rights immediately after World War II, has actually worked to distort its own definitions 
of human rights since then. The result has been to undermine the basis of human rights in legally 
enforceable social contracts to balance power and to ensure citizen participation and oversight of 
government and non-governmental concentrations of power. This politicization of rights debate in 
the era of globalization has diverted attention from structurally enforceable social contract forms 
in a way that has undermined the earlier legal consensus on human rights, and that has undermined 
effective measurement. The basis of the United Nations system in the governments of “nation-
states” has created a fundamental contradiction with the goals of social contract. The result has 
been the replacement of rule of law goals with goals of globalization in which powers are 
essentially concentrated in the leaders of nation states and the ruling ethnic groups. Rather than 
promote rights, this system has promoted a return to forms of colonialism that undermine any real 
and professional approaches to defining, measuring and achieving human rights. Thus, moving 
towards measures requires understanding and overcoming this structural barrier that now pervades 
discussions on rights. 
This section analyzes the ideology of the international system that underlined human rights 
approaches, then shows how the definitions and measures were also corrupted to eliminate 
structural social contract mechanisms as well as the goals of power balancing among individuals 
and cultures. A comparison of the international community’s development aspirations (its 
“universal development goals”) with its list of universal human rights also helps reveal these gaps.  
Looking at the U.N.’s current approaches to measures shows how the ideology has now directly 
influenced and worked to dismantle systematic professional measures. A final subsection shows 
how the ideology of globalization, largely based in the approaches of European colonialism prior 
to World Wars I and II, seems to have replaced the goals of human rights agreements, established 
after World War II, in an attempt to prevent another potential world war. With this ideology now 
driving the U.N. system, it may now be impossible to generate any effective human rights measures 
within that international system, today.  
 
How the International System Undermined its Professional Approach to Human Rights 
 
While the definition of the United Nations system on human rights recognizes the 
inextricable connection of rights with legal enforcement through social contract, in a system of 
balancing of powers and direct citizen control over their governments and other institutions, the 
U.N. now undermines that approach. 
The U.N. system is clear that “[h]uman rights are universal legal guarantees protecting 
individuals and groups.”39 As noted above in the sections, this language and its meaning come 
directly out of social contract theories of human rights and definitions of contract. In other words, 
rights are only “guarantees” when they are enforceable. Accordingly, they are only enforceable 
                                                 
39 See supra note 13, at 10. 
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when remedies and enforcement bodies exist through contract. The contracting parties to such 
enforceable contracts are the citizens holding rights with other citizens. The bodies they create, 
such as the courts, are created by that contract and either staffed directly by citizens (in juries) or 
by people who are directly under the control of the citizens, subject to hiring, firing and payment 
by citizens. All of this is clear not only in “social contract theory” but in the history of 
representative government, as well as the legal system that has developed over more than two 
centuries to regulate it. 
The key legal principle behind a “legal guarantee” when it comes to government actions is 
the legal principle of “master-servant” that is at the heart of public administration. This principle 
of law defines “servants” as directly responsible to their “masters.” In public administration, the 
“legal guarantee” that protects the rights of citizens from abuse by government officials is that the 
citizens are the “master” and the government employees are the “(public) servants” who serve 
them. In the tasking of public servants, citizens both maintain control and establish mechanisms 
for remedies to enforce the rights of citizen control. Similarly, under the laws, organizations of 
institutional authority that collect public and private resources are also subject to public chartering 
and to citizen oversight through a social contract. 
The United Nations also makes it clear that this contracting power that resides in individual 
citizens and cultures or communities cannot be assumed or transferred away. The U.N. is clear that 
“[h]uman rights are universal, inalienable, interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.”40 
Furthermore, an “inalienable” power must be a direct and enforceable one. This also implies that 
rights exist in a balanced way. Moreover, the concept of rights being “indivisible” implies that the 
legal “guarantee” must be through a contract that balances power in a unified and systematic way, 
or in other words, through a structural form, rather than acts piecemeal through legislation or 
financing. 
Nevertheless, after defining human rights in this way, consistent with social contractual 
power balancing and enforcement, the United Nations system simultaneously eviscerates this 
principle when it describes how rights should be viewed and achieved.  In practice, the U.N. 
redefines human rights as emerging from a top-down approach rather than through a contract, in 
ways that disempower both citizens and minority cultures/communities, making citizens servants 
to their governments and powers behind them. The U.N. creates a legal fiction that legitimizes pre-
existing authority of nation-state governments without any social contract or law that establishes 
citizens and minority cultures/communities as their dependents. These nation-state authorities 
“bestow” rights on their citizens as grants or benefits at the whim of the authorities. This creative 
legal fiction is embodied in specially created ideological terms that reinforce existing authority. 
Rather than promote social contract obligations, the U.N. assigns decisions on rights to nation-
state authorities who are euphemistically called “duty bearers” (meaning, pre-existing U.N. 
legitimated government authority) while the people over whom they rule are euphemistically 
called “rights holders” (citizens and minority cultures/communities subject to the potential abuses 
of pre-existing power). According to the U.N., “[t]he underlying feature of human rights is the 
identification of rights holders, who, by virtue of being human, have a claim to certain entitlements, 
and duty bearers, who are legally bound to respect, protect and fulfill the entitlements associated 
with those claims.41 This language of “duty bearers” directly undermines the social contract 
approach of enforceable “legal guarantees,” of power balancing, and of citizens and 
communities/cultures as “masters” and authorities as their “(public) servants.” 
                                                 
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
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The basis of this concept of “duty bearer” simply reflects that the U.N. system is a system 
of created “nation-states” with the elite representatives of these states (their militaries and foreign 
policy representatives) negotiating international agreements. Technically, these signatories do 
have “duties” to citizens under rights treaties. In keeping with the basic principles of rights treaties, 
those duties are to negotiate afresh the social contracts in their societies to meet the obligations of 
“legal guarantees” of citizens and weaker communities/cultures through power balancing. 
However, this is not how the international system has used this language. Instead, they have used 
it to legitimize a concept of rights that dates to the feudal ages and back to pre-democratic political 
theories (of Hobbes, Locke, and Machiavelli, in western political science, as well as Confucius 
and Ashoka in some Asian political science) in which a pre-existing elite acting under a “mandate 
of Heaven” or other created religious authority, bestows benefits on its populations in a “contract” 
that allows it to maintain its power. 
Certainly, the idea of a “rights holder” is itself a fiction. By definition under law, one does 
not have a “right” unless there is an enforceable remedy. This implies the existence of power 
balancing and a social contract among citizens, themselves, to protect their interests as well as to 
balance the power of their communities/cultures.  In the current U.N. discourse however, this has 
disappeared. The “rights holders” are dependent in the manner of feudal serfs and slaves. 
The correct analogue to a “rights holder” in a system of “legal guarantees” is not a “duty 
bearer.” Instead, it is the “rights abuser.” The balance to be attained is between the “victim” (the 
“rights holder” whose rights are violated) and the “abuser” (the violator of the rights of the rights 
holder). This, again, is a clear power dynamic. The solution to preventing the abuses by the 
“abuser” is to focus on outcomes such as balances of power and on structural mechanisms of social 
contract.   
Indeed, in many cases today, the “abusers” who violate rights are in fact the very 
government officials whom the U.N. system legitimizes as the “duty bearers.” Where these “duty 
bearers” are the abusers themselves, there can be no expectation of solutions. This is as absurd as 
calling the wolves guarding the henhouse the “duty bearers” and the hens that they are guarding 
(to eat) as “the “rights holders.” However, this is what the U.N. system has done. In other cases, 
such as current and historic slave trades, the “abusers” are the purchasers, in a foreign country, 
while the “victims” are in the originating country. They are not the governing “duty bearers.” The 
U.N. system however, does not even recognize the abusers. It only recognizes the “duty bearers” 
in the countries of the victims. The problem is that in many countries with dependent, weak or 
fragmented governments, it is difficult to find these supposed “duty bearers” without suggesting 
that the actual social contract rights which are needed for protection may extend beyond the current 
nation-state (to other actors in the international system). Thus, the U.N. system’s focus on nation-
state governments as “duty bearers” works to create a smoke screen that hides the realities of 
contemporary power in the international system as well as within nation-states themselves. Indeed, 
actors who violate rights may be foreign corporations or foreign militaries. The distorted language 
used by the U.N. to hide the realities of power in the international system and in nation-states in 
fact puts the victims of various inequalities at greater risk. 
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This system, as the U.N. has now redefined it, is what sociologists view not only as a feudal 
view, but as one that manipulates the victims to promote the authority of the abusers. They refer 
to this approach as “regulating the poor.”42 
 
How the Measurements of Human Rights Have Been Undermined 
 
In addition to changing the accepted definitions and principles for human rights, the U.N. 
system has now undermined and confused all of the measurements. Tables 1A and 1B above, in 
the first section of this paper, demonstrate how the international definitions of human rights and 
the social science of human rights revealed an interlocking system of aspirations and social 
contract legal enforcement principles that, together, achieve measurable balances of power with 
positive and negative freedoms. The specific outcomes are power balances achieved through social 
contract. The structural mechanisms are directly linked to them as the structural measures for 
achieving these outcomes. The “human rights” can be seen as the list of aspirations that are the 
intermediate link between the power balances and the structural mechanisms to achieve them. By 
detaching the structural mechanisms and the outcome measures of power balances from the 
concept of human rights, the U.N. system has stripped human rights of both their meaning and 
their measures. Along with replacing the accepted definition of rights with a set of fictional 
nonsense terms of “duty bearer” and “rights holder,” the U.N. system has also redefined outcomes 
and structures in ways that are also nonsense. 
It is easy to see what has happened by comparing the traditional identification of human 
rights as “legal guarantees” (the definition that the U.N. system uses but does not fulfill) with the 
current identification of rights. Under the U.N. approach, rights are only aspirations to be filled, 
top-down, by government bureaucrats, stripped of all enforceable guarantees, as if they are no 
more than social services for the poor or bread for the masses.  There would be nothing wrong 
with listing rights as aspirations so long as these aspirations are then linked to specific structural 
mechanisms for “legal guarantees” that offer power balancing and enforcement.  However, the 
U.N. system has eliminated this linkage. 
 
The Historical Approach to Rights, Combining Structure and Social Contract with Aspirations   
 
In historical statements of human rights, like the U.S. Bill of Rights from the Constitution,43 
there seemed to be little danger of rights being stripped of structural social contract guarantees and 
the intended outcomes of power balancing. That is because the Bill of Rights listed the rights in 
very specific legal terms that combined specific structural mechanisms for power balancing (like 
independent militaries for communities/cultures and juries in civil cases) with specific legal 
language on how the parties were to interpret the terms.   
A summarized version of the Bill of Rights is presented in Table 2. The left column 
presents the respective right and the place it appears in the first Ten Amendments to the 
Constitution which comprises the Bill of Rights. 
In Table 2, those “rights” that are in fact specific structural provisions or that can be 
understood in the context of the time as recognizing specific legal structures, are highlighted in 
yellow. Six of these ten “human rights” are in fact social contract mechanisms and another is a 
                                                 
42 See FRANCES FOX PIVEN AND RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC 
WELFARE (1993). 
43 See U.S. CONST. 
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standard contract clause. Along with them are three other limitations of powers for clarity, to assure 
no misunderstandings or attempts by government to expand its power (the limitations are on 
military and government in criminal prosecution and punishment). These are presented along with 
the contract enforcement provisions. 
Among the assumptions of that time, for example, were that there existed competitive 
political parties as well as independent, competitive media, and that citizens could freely form and 
access both, without legal obstacles or financial obstacles (unlike today in the U.S. and in most 
places elsewhere). There was also no existing corporate power to oversee. Those corporations that 
would arise, starting in the early 19th century, would come directly under government charter and 
oversight in ways that for a time assured effective citizen control, unlike today. There was also no 
overseas hegemonic power to consider, as the country had just been freed from British rule and 
was far from any other political or economic interference. Note that the rights listed are civil and 
political rights, and not social rights other than the protections of “federalism” for culture and 
communities. There is no economic policy here. The existence of equal opportunity for household 
heads who were the contractors to this agreement and for their family members was assumed. 
The second text column in Table 2 compares the 10 rights in the U.S. Bill of Rights with 
those lists of rights that are mentioned in universal human rights treaties, today. The mismatch 
between the two is clear. Where there are specific social contract mechanisms, there is no 
correlative right in international treaties. Only the specific legal language limiting government 
action in ways that establish clear legal understandings for interpreting the power balances that are 
agreed, are put in writing. In other words, the list of aspirations that are in universal human rights 
treaties today are simply the clarification language. The force of the Bill of Rights as a social 
contract is in the structural legal mechanisms that are the enforcement guarantees and the power 
balancing for achieving the aspirations and not in the aspirations, themselves, but it is these that 
have disappeared in the U.N. system listing of rights. 
The history of the U.S. Bill of Rights also makes clear the intent and purpose of these 
natural rights.  Agrarian communities did not agree to a central government. In fact, they thwarted 
an earlier attempt to create one (the Articles of Confederation). This faction, the “Anti-
Federalists,” agreed to this social contract only with recognized structural enforcement powers that 
gave them political equality and assured their protection.44 
These “Anti-Federalists” did not see “rights” as a theological list of goodwill for their 
political opponents to promise and then to achieve later. They did not recognize government 
officials as “duty bearers” promising to enforce rights of “rights holders.” Instead, they saw rights 
as recognition of contractual enforcement mechanisms of citizen and cultural power to supplement 
the system created by the post-colonial military.  Moreover, the enforceability was not based on 
measures of impact/outcome but on these institutional, structural process mechanisms. Compared 
to this approach, the international approach today is backwards.   
Much of what the Anti-Federalists thought they had secured in the way of protections has 
been eroded. The goals of power balancing and protection of citizen rights have not been protected 
because the power balancing goals were not written explicitly in the contract. None of the 
assumptions about how specific mechanisms and goals were to be achieved, or about the context 
in which the contract was written, were included in the “social contract” of the Bill of Rights. All 
that has not been written down has been stripped away because judges are not anthropologists 
imagining the context in which a contract operated and giving full meaning to its intent. In fact, 
                                                 
44 See BRUTUS, To the Citizens of the State of New York in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 1787 (Herbert J. 
Storing, ed., 2008). 
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much of what has been written down has also been eroded, as is demonstrated for two of the rights 
in the Bill of Rights, in the final right hand column of Table 1B.  
It is this historical knowledge that should have infused the systematization of human rights. 
While it is possible that it partly did, the U.N. has now worked to strip it away. 
 
Table 2.  U.S. Bill of Rights (10 Amendments) 
 
No. Content Correlative in 
International 
Human  Rights 
Doctrines 
Social Contract 
Enforcement 
1 Freedom of the Press (Assumed 
equal individual access) 
Not in international 
rights treaties 
Individual access to 
press to exercise 
direct oversight over 
public and private 
power 
 Freedom of Speech IDHR 19; ICCPR 
19 
 
 Freedom of Religion IDHR 18; ICCPR 
18 
 
 Freedom of Association IDHR 18, 20; 
ICCPR 18, 21 
 
 (Political Parties:  Protection of 
Existing Associations such as 
Multi-Party Competition) 
Not in international 
rights treaties 
Political 
Competition 
2 Individual right to arms (against 
government and others) 
Not in international 
rights treaties 
Independent power 
against the 
state/police and 
others 
 Right of Armed Militias Not in international 
rights treaties 
Independent power 
against military and 
police 
3 No quartering of soldiers in peace-
time 
Not in international 
treaties 
A restriction on size 
and activities of 
military power 
4 Right to Privacy IDHR 12; ICCPR 
17 
 
5 Grand Jury indictments in major 
cases 
Not in international 
treaties 
Citizen check on 
Prosecutorial power 
 Jury Trials in Criminal Cases Not in international 
rights treaties 
Citizen check on 
Criminal Law 
enforcement 
 Due Process IDHR 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 17; ICCPR 9, 
15, 16 
 
 Freedom from Self-Incrimination ICCPR 14  
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 Non Discrimination ICCPR 26  
6 Assistance of Counsel in Criminal 
Trials 
Not in international 
treaties 
Citizen check on 
Prosecutorial power 
7 Jury Trials in Civil Cases Not in international 
treaties 
Citizen check on 
Inequality and on 
Judicial power 
8 Limitations on Punishment IDHR 5,10; ICCPR 
7 
 
9 Rights remain with people and 
powers of government cannot be 
expanded 
Not in international 
treaties 
Contract clause for 
clarity and 
protection 
10 State Autonomy Partly in ICESCR 1 Federalism/Cultural 
Protection 
 State Contractual Authority Not in international 
rights treaties 
Federalism: 
Balancing of 
Cultural Powers 
 
 
The Weakness of International Rights Statements and Failure to Link to Overall Power Balancing 
Goals or Structural Social Contract Mechanisms 
 
The international system’s presentation of human rights today, described above, is a 
statement of universal “aspirations.” Although mostly a set of statements of “negative liberty” or 
“freedom from” abuse, this set of international documents simultaneously creates a system of 
“positive liberty” or “freedom to” in the form of aspirations for “development” hidden within it. 
Table 3 presents a list of human rights that are identified in some of the major international 
treaties. The first two columns identify the right in short form along with its source.  Indeed, there 
is now a proliferation of rights treaties that continues to expand the list. The purpose of this 
presentation is to make it clear that the listing is potentially infinite as proponents continue to come 
up with details of their concerns, and that it is not directly actionable because the rights are not 
linked with the real outcome goals for rights; achieving power balances through structural 
mechanisms like those presented as rights in the Bill of Rights. 
The third and fourth column of the Table clarify what each of the rights is about. The rights are 
really about power balancing with certain groups and the “outcomes” that underlie the rights are 
in fact these balances of power. The human rights treaties, however, do not categorize the rights 
into these categories which are their true goals and the ways of measuring performance and 
progress. 
In column four, five distinct categories emerge that help to demonstrate the underlying goals 
of the listing of human rights. 
- The majority of human rights are in fact designed for power balancing for individual rights in 
the oversight of government and economic power. To make these rights enforceable, the 
structural mechanisms that are needed are those of political equality and social equality that 
allow for effective oversight and management of institutions and for checking the power of 
individuals. 
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- A second set of human rights is designed to ensure a balance of powers among 
cultures/communities (i.e., an effective system of federalism) that assures equal political and 
social rights among communities/cultures. 
- A third set of rights combines social policy and equal opportunity. For a social contract to be 
sustainable, individuals and communities need to be empowered.  Part of that empowerment 
is through education and access to resources as well as partly through institutional mechanisms. 
- There are growing areas of “rights” that are really social policies. These are not traditionally 
contracted rights at all. The general definition of rights is that there are systems of inequality 
and that one has a “right” against others to maintain this balance. Social policy does not fit into 
this construct at all. It seems to represent the transition of international policy goals, perhaps 
for “regulating the poor,” into statements of “rights” without clear justification. In fact, the 
obligation on social policy, to assure welfare, may be more clearly linked to an obligation for 
sustainability within a resource base. This would include limits to population growth and 
consumption to assure balances, rather than requirements for public spending that are 
unsustainable. This seems to fit with the treaty obligations on sustainability and culture 
protection.45 
- There is a final area of rights that also challenges traditional notions of rights as well as the 
U.N. system’s definition of rights. In an era of globalization, “social contracts” at the level of 
individual societies and governments may not be enough to balance power and protect rights. 
The international system, itself, is currently outside of effective citizen control and power 
balancing. It is a new actor in rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 See supra note 33. 
24
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol10/iss2/5
DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 25 
Table 3.  Categorization of the List of Internationally Recognized Human Rights 
 
Name or Type of 
Right 
Source in 
International 
Law 
How it Would 
be Enforceable 
(Asserted 
Against Whom) 
Measure and 
Mechanism of Right 
Life, Liberty, 
Security also 
International 
Agreements (see 
below) 
IDHR 3; 
ICCPR 6 
Government; 
Private parties;  
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Freedom from 
Slavery and Forced 
Labor, Debtors’ 
Prison 
IDHR 4; 
ICCPR 8, 11 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Freedom from 
Torture 
IDHR 5; 
ICCPR 7 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Legal status as a 
person; right to legal 
remedies 
IDHR 6, 8; 
ICCPR 16 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Protection against 
discrimination, 
inequality 
IDHR 7   Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile 
IDHR 9; 
ICCPR 9 
Government Social contract; 
Oversight of Security 
State 
Criminal due 
process; habeus 
corpus; self- 
incrimination 
IDHR 10, 11; 
ICCPR  9, 11, 
14, 15, 16 
Government Social contract; 
Oversight of Security 
State 
No ex-post facto law ICCPR 15 Government Social contract; 
Oversight of Security 
State 
Respectful 
punishment and 
incarceration 
ICCPR 10 Government Social contract; 
Oversight of Security 
State 
Privacy and dignity IDHR 12; 
ICCPR 17 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Protections against 
hate speech 
ICCPR 20 Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
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Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Legality of Adult 
consensual activity 
ICCPR 17 Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Freedom of 
movement 
IDHR 13; 
ICCPR 12 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Right to marriage 
and family 
IDHR 16; 
ICCPR 23 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Nondiscrimination 
of parentage 
IDHR 25 Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Family leave for 
protection of 
children 
ICESCR 10 Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Right to property IDHR 17 Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Freedom of religion, 
thought 
IDHR 18; 
ICCPR 18 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Free speech and 
access to 
information 
IDHR 19; 
ICCPR 19 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Freedom of 
assembly and 
association 
IDHR 20; 
ICCPR 21 
Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law 
Right to participate 
in government 
IDHR 21 Government; 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
Oversight of 
Government; Access to 
Civil Law; 
Equal opportunity to 
political capital 
Right to electoral 
representation 
IDHR 21 Government Social contract equality; 
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through free and fair 
elections 
Non Discrimination ICCPR 26 Government; 
Private 
Social contract; Equal 
opportunity; Civil law 
access 
Equal Rights for 
Women 
CEDAW Government, 
Private Parties 
Social contract equality; 
civil law; equal 
opportunity 
Self Determination 
(group rights) 
ICESCR 1 Other Cultures Federalism contract 
Right to Culture and 
Language (see also 
below) 
ICCPR 27 Other Cultures Federalism 
Social security IDHR 22; 
ICCSR 9 
Government Social policy; equal 
opportunity 
Education IDHR 22, 26; 
ICESCR 13, 
14 
Government Social contract equality; 
equal opportunity 
Work  IDHR 23; 
ICCSR 6 
- Social policy; equal 
opportunity 
Unions IDHR 23; 
ICCPR 22; 
ICCSR 8 
Private Parties 
(Corporations) 
Civil law  
Work conditions, 
leisure 
IDHR 24; 
ICCSR 7 
Private Parties 
(Corporations) 
Social policy; Civil law 
Food, Clothing, 
Housing, Health 
Care 
IDHR 25; 
ICESCR 11 
- Social policy 
Physical and Mental 
Health development 
ICESCR 12 - Social policy 
Tolerance education IDHR 26  Social policy 
Culture and science IDHR 27; 
ICESCR 15 
? Social policy 
[Several aspects of 
childhood 
development] 
Child Rights 
Convention 
Provisions 
? Social policy 
Right to Asylum; 
appeal for resident 
aliens 
IDHR 14; 
ICCPR 13 
International 
agreements with 
other nations 
Social contracting under 
international law 
Right to a 
Nationality 
IDHR 15; 
ICCPR 24 
International 
agreements with 
other nations 
Social contracting under 
international law 
Life, Liberty and 
Security (see also 
above) 
IDHR 3; 
ICCPR 6; 
Geneva 
International 
agreements (for 
collective 
Social contracting under 
international law 
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Convention 4; 
Genocide 
Convention 
security) with 
other nations 
Freedom from 
Slavery and Forced 
Labor, Debtors’ 
Prison (see also 
above) 
IDHR 4; 
ICCPR 8, 11; 
Geneva 
Convention 4 
International 
agreements (for 
collective 
security) with 
other nations 
Social contracting under 
international law 
Freedom from 
Torture (see also 
above) 
IDHR 5; 
ICCPR 7; 
Geneva 
Convention 4 
International 
agreements (for 
collective 
security) with 
other nations 
Social contracting under 
international law 
Right to Culture and 
Language (see also 
above) 
Geneva 
Convention; 
Rome Statute; 
Genocide 
Convention 
International 
agreements (for 
collective 
security) with 
other nations 
Social contracting under 
international law 
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The way these rights are stated in international treaties also raises some questions as to 
whether they can be enforceable. For example, there is a clear difference between the “right to 
information” and the right to equal participation in media, the latter of which is assumed in the Bill 
of Rights. There is also a clear difference between “participation in government” or “freedom of 
association,” and the right to establish political parties on an equal basis. All are implied for them 
to be realized, but the U.N. system does not spell out any of these linkages to “legal guarantees.” 
There are no rights to jury trials, oversight panels, or grand juries and no descriptions of these 
mechanisms in a list of “solutions and mechanisms for legal guarantees” anywhere in international 
rights treaties. There is no right to militias or to military protection for cultures or for federal 
systems. There is no mention of split executives, split judiciaries (to balance cultural rights in a 
system of federalism) or removal of government officials. Therefore, the U.N. system’s statements 
de-fang the earlier “legal guarantee” approaches to rights. 
Nor is there any method for examining the “deep structure” of systems to determine the 
existing power balances and how they work. There is no consideration of government balances of 
powers or definitions of power(s). Note that there are not specific types of institutions or laws to 
be copied from one system and implanted to another, the way many human rights interventions 
are now designed (hiding motives of assimilation under the guise of rights). What is missing 
however, are the social contract mechanisms of power balancing through redistribution of control 
of real power (e.g., military, police, economic power or media) and through direct participation in 
processes where power is exercised (e.g., prosecution and judicial determination). 
For the rights that would be enforceable under international law, the U.N. system does not 
recognize other governments as duty bearers other than in acts of war, and does not create or imply 
independent rights against governments where one is not a citizen. Only a government may ask 
another government to enforce them or seek to enforce them through the U.N. where there is an 
existing enforcement agreement. 
 
The “Flip Side” of Universal Human Rights Goals: Universal Development Goals Provide the 
Aspirational Categories for Human Rights, but they have been Discarded 
 
The place to look for the overall categories of goals and measurements should be in the 
universal development goals. This “inverse” of the list of human rights is, itself, contained in the 
rights treaties, and establishes very clear categories of “outcome goals” for human rights in terms 
of balances of power. Theoretically, if the U.N.’s definitions were consistent and coherent, specific 
legal structures (i.e., social contract structural approaches to human rights) could then be defined 
as goals in regular plans for achieving these development goals. This is not what has happened. 
The development goals are not even formally recognized and there is no effort to create any kind 
of legal consistency or codification of these treaties other than, perhaps, through my own efforts 
to now create this codification. It is only through the technique of statutory analysis, that those 
“universal development goals” found in international treaties, are even now recognized in the 
academic literature at all.46  
 
                                                 
46 See David Lempert, Universal Development Goals for this Millennium, 12  CONSILIENCE (2014); see also 
David Lempert, A Vision for International Development and a Tool for Comparisons, 16 JOURNAL FOR 
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (2014).  
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Next, Table 4 lists the 13 “universal development goals” in four key categories.47 Since the 
“development goals” are really the inverse of “rights” in the international system, the two columns 
should be nearly identical. This is because the goals are based in and furthered by rights, and the 
rights are a restatement of the goals: “freedom to” and “freedom from” are the flip side of each 
other. 
In fact, the lists of “human rights” do not yet perfectly match up with the universal 
development goals, even though they are both taken from the same sets of treaties. This reiterates 
the problem inherent in current international lists of human rights. That said, not only are 
statements in the international system for “rights” just part of the aspirations for development, but 
they without links to structural measures for enforceability. Even more so, they are not adequately 
linked with their expected outcomes in terms of “development” for expanding human potential by 
offering political and social equality at the individual and cultural/community level. There are 
weaknesses in promoting the rights of cultures/communities, which reflects one of the inherent 
weaknesses in the current international system and the system of human rights. Although cultures 
are theoretically protected by law under the Genocide Convention, the international system is 
extremely weak in establishing the basic structural mechanisms and aspirations for full cultural 
protections in systems of federalism. There are similar weaknesses in the steps towards political 
and social equality.  
                                                 
47 The list is in the left-hand column in this four-sectioned table. In the right-column lists rights that are found in 
human rights treaties that can be matched up with the development goals.   
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Table 4.  Overlap between Human Rights Categories and “Universal Development Goals” in U.N. 
Treaties 
 
1. Individual Development Goals:   
 
 Overall 
Objectives 
Corresponding Human Rights 
1. Physical 
(body) 
development:   
Child Rights Convention; Right to food, clothing, housing, health 
care (IDHR 25, ICESCR 11); Physical health development 
(ICESCR 12); Social security (IDHR 22, ICCSR 9) 
2. Mental 
development:   
Child Rights Convention; Right to education (IDHR 22, 26; 
ICESCR 13, 14): Mental health development (ICESCR 12) 
3. Spiritual 
(appreciation 
of natural 
world) 
development:   
Child Rights Convention; Culture and science (IDHR 27, ICESCR 
15) 
4. Moral 
(appreciation 
of others as 
individuals) 
development:   
Child Rights Convention; Tolerance education (IDHR 26) 
5. Social 
(appreciation 
of 
community) 
development:   
Child Rights Convention; Tolerance education (IDHR 26) 
6. Cultural 
(appreciation 
of one’s 
identity) 
development:   
Child Rights Convention; Family leave for protection of children 
(ICESCR 10); Culture education (IDHR 27, ICSR 15) 
 
2. Societal Level Development Goals   
 
 Overall 
Objectives 
Corresponding Human Rights 
7. Social 
equity/ 
Social 
progress/ 
Equal 
opportunity 
for 
individuals   
Legal Status as a person; right to legal remedies (IDHR 6, 8, 
ICCPR 16); Protection against discrimination, inequality (IDHR 
7); Equal rights for women (CEDAW); Non Discrimination 
(ICCPR 26); Freedom from Slavery and Forced Labor, Debtor’s 
Prison (IDHR 4, ICCPR 8, 11); Right to Work (IDHR 23, ICCSR 
6); Right to unionize (IDHR 23, ICCPR 22); Right to humane 
work conditions and leisure (IDHR 24, ICCSR 7); Privacy and 
dignity (IDHR 12; ICCPR 17); Legality of Adult consensual 
activity (ICCPR 17); Right to marriage and family (IDHR 16, 
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ICCPR 23); Non-discrimination of parentage (IDHR 25); Right to 
property (IDHR 17); Freedom of religion, thought (IDHR 18, 
ICCPR 18); Right to culture and language (ICCPR 27); Most of 
these Reaffirmed in Child Rights Convention 
[Never stated as positive liberty, only negative (freedom from 
restriction but not for equality)] 
8. Political 
equity/ Equal 
rights for 
individuals:   
Legal Status as a person; right to legal remedies (IDHR 6, 8, 
ICCPR 16); Protection against discrimination, inequality (IDHR 
7); Equal rights for women (CEDAW); Non Discrimination 
(ICCPR 26); Freedom from Slavery and Forced Labor (IDHR 4, 
ICCPR 8, 11); Freedom from Torture (IDHR 5, ICCPR 7); 
Freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (IDHR 9, ICCPR 
9); Criminal due process, Habeus corpus, self-incrimination 
(IDHR 10, 11, ICCPR 9, 11, 14, 15, 16); No ex-post facto law 
(ICCPR 15); Respectful punishment and incarceration (ICCPR 
10);  Free speech and access to information (IDHR 19, ICCPR 19); 
Freedom of assembly and association (IDHR 20, ICCPR 21); 
Right to participate in government (IDHR 21); Right to electoral 
representation through free and fair elections (IDHR 21); 
Reaffirmed in Child Rights Convention 
[Never stated as positive liberty, only negative (freedom from 
restriction but not for equality)] 
9. Peace/ 
Tolerance/ 
De-
militarization 
for 
individuals:   
Life, Liberty, Security (IDHR 3, ICCPR 6); Equal rights for 
women (CEDAW); Non Discrimination (ICCPR 26); Protections 
against hate speech (ICCPR 20); Freedom of movement (IDHR 
13, ICCPR 12); Freedom of religion, thought (IDHR 18, ICCPR 
18); Right to culture and language (ICCPR 27); Right to Asylum 
(IDHR 14, ICCPR 13); Social security (IDHR 22, ICCSR 9); 
Reaffirmed in Child Rights Convention 
 
3. Cultural/ Community Level Goals 
 
 Overall 
Objectives 
Corresponding Human Rights 
10.  Sustainability/ 
(sovereignty) 
of cultures:   
Life, Liberty, Security (IDHR 3, ICCPR 6, Geneva Convention 4, 
Genocide Convention); Self Determination (group rights) 
(ICESCR 1); Right to culture and language (ICCPR 27, Geneva 
Convention, Rome Statute, Genocide Convention); Right to a 
nationality (IDHR 15, ICCPR 24); Child Rights Convention on 
education and transmission of culture 
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4. Global Development Goals 
 
 Overall 
Objectives 
Corresponding Human Rights 
11.  Social 
equity/ 
Social 
progress/ 
Equal 
opportunity 
of cultures:   
Self Determination (group rights) (ICESCR 1); Right to culture 
and language (ICCPR 27)  
[Implied in the Genocide Convention, Rome Statute and other 
treaties but not recognized] 
12.  Political 
equity/ Equal 
rights for 
cultures:   
Self Determination (group rights) (ICESCR 1); 
[Implied in the Genocide Convention, Rome Statute and other 
treaties but not recognized] 
13.  Peace/ 
Tolerance/ 
De-
militarization 
for 
protection of 
cultures:   
 Life, Liberty, Security (IDHR 3, ICCPR 6, Geneva Convention 4, 
Genocide Convention); Self Determination (group rights) 
(ICESCR 1);  
 
United Nations System Approaches to Measures Strips the “Structural” and “Outcome” Goals of 
their Required Content 
 
Despite a lack of explicit reference in international human rights treaties to either the 
underlying “universal development goals” for balancing powers through political and social equity 
at the individual and cultural/community level, and even though the treaties do not define structural 
social contract law mechanisms that would provide “legal guarantees,” the U.N. system is 
mandated to do this. In fact, it claims that it does do this. The reality, however, is that it has 
substituted a different agenda that undermines its stated goals. 
The treaty system for human rights imposes two obligations on its state parties. The U.N. 
system calls them: (1) the “obligation of conduct” and (2) the “obligation of result.”48 If state 
parties were to correctly identify power balancing as its “obligation of result,” and structural social 
contract mechanisms as the way to provide “legal guarantees” for its list of human rights in 
fulfillment of its “obligation of conduct” (following the example in Table 1B), it would in fact 
fulfill its mandate of promoting human rights. 
The U.N. system does, of course, by its own definition of human rights, recognize changing 
power balances through social contract as a means to achieving them, but it also finds a way to 
avoid having to do so. Rather than identify this approach as the required one, it redefines it as only 
one among several possible measures that it offers as ineffective substitutes. The U.N. system 
allows for the substitution of “participation, accountability and effective remedies” for what it calls 
                                                 
48 See supra note 13, at 12. 
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“cross cutting” goals (categorical approaches to imbalances of power that are recognized, for 
example, as “discrimination”).49 
To short-circuit the system of achieving rights, the U.N. has redefined “structure” and 
“outcomes.” Additionally, the U.N. has refocused its achievements on social policy (essentially, 
“regulating” or “buying off” the poor), in place of any changes in relative power or of any real 
oversight and accountability of the “rights abusers.” 
Table 5 offers an analysis of the U.N. system categories for measurements of the fulfillment 
of human rights, and how they should be professionally corrected to assure that the measurements 
are consistent with social science and professional notions of human rights. The left-hand column 
presents the three categories of measures that the U.N. system now uses. The central column lists 
the measures that the U.N. system now offers as linked with achieving human rights. Finally, the 
right-hand column re-labels the types of indicators that the U.N. system uses in ways that make it 
clear which are significant and relevant and which are simply without merit. 
In place of structural social contract law mechanisms, the U.N. system splits its indicators 
into both “structural” and “process” indicators so that “processes” like the passage of an 
unenforceable law or the creation of an “action plan” that allocates more money (such as for health 
care) can substitute for a real change in relative power.50 Although it seems like a cruel joke, one 
of the main measures that the U.N. system now offers as an example of a “structural” change, is 
simply the signing of another one of its treaties. Unfortunately, most of the practitioners in the 
“human rights” community today seem to follow this blindly, and, perhaps cynically agree to 
actions that are meaningless, or are perhaps unaware. However, one of the main measures of 
“progress” towards human rights as of a decade ago was “the state of ratification of international 
human rights standards.”51 
In examining the measurements and indicators that the U.N. system now uses for its work 
in rights overall, there is a clear shift away from any kind of empowerment and power balancing 
in every category other than for women’s rights. The focus is now on social policy, with the 
measure being the transfer of funds to groups such as women and children, or to particular sectors 
such as education and health. In other words, of the 40 or so areas of rights listed in Table 3, the 
U.N. system essentially now focuses only on about 10% of those, while excluding the rest. Though 
the U.N. claims that rights are “interdependent and indivisible,”52 that is not how the system works 
in implementation. The system seems to be unaccountable. 
 
                                                 
49 Id. at 41.  
50 Id. at 35. 
51 See R. Malhotra and N. Fasel, QUANTITATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS: A SURVEY OF MAJOR INITIATIVE, 
NORDIC NETWORK SEMINAR IN HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH (Mar. 10-13, 2005), 
http://www.gaportal.org/sites/default/files/Quantitative%20Human%20Rights%20Indicators.pdf. 
52 See supra note 13, at 10.  
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Table 5.  Correction of Ideological “Newspeak” in Human Rights Fulfillment 
 
Current Category Used 
by United Nations 
System 
Specific  Mechanisms 
within the Category 
Corrected 
(“Translated”) 
Designation based on 
Actual Relation to 
Progress in Human 
Rights 
Structural Intervention Enforceable Power 
Balance (Domestic) 
Structural Change 
through Enforceable 
Social Contract 
[Enforceable Power 
Balance (International)]* 
Global Structural Change 
through Enforceable 
International Law 
Signing of a U.N. Treaty Paper Promise 
Passage of a Law Paper Promise 
National Policy Paper Promise 
Action Plan Paper Promise 
Process Activities Allocation of Funds Legislative Activity 
Creation of monitoring 
indicators 
Monitoring Activity 
Public Awareness 
Campaigns 
- (May not be relevant) 
Outcomes Economic Benefit Social Welfare Measure 
Measures of Violations Symptom Measure 
Change in Power Balance Real Structural Change 
through Enforceable 
Power Balancing 
 
* This category is added to the table.  The U.N. does not specifically mention it. 
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Although it seems like another cruel joke, the U.N. system has introduced another concept 
to its rights measures that is in complete contradiction to the idea of human rights and works to 
undermine them. To explain its lack of commitment to the human rights agenda of treaties, the 
U.N. system now offers a rationalization that the way to achieve rights is through a “progressive 
realization” in “developing countries.” Essentially, this means that the timeline for real 
achievements assures that they never occur.  This concept of “progressive realization” claims, with 
no foundation in reality or in legal authority in treaties, that the achievement of “rights” depends 
on wealth, rather than on distributions of power.53 This approach works to legitimize vast 
inequalities of power and wealth behind the curtain of so-called “resource constraints” so that the 
disparity of wealth can continue without any changes in relative power that would achieve actual 
rights. This concept is another fiction created by the U.N. system to protect power and legitimize 
abuses so long as there is some payoff to those who are disempowered. There is no direct 
relationship between a country’s overall wealth and its internal political equality.  Indeed, 
developed countries are now experiencing a reversal in both economic and political equality. There 
is homogenization that occurs with cultural destruction and transition to a common technology, 
but it is a destruction of one form of equality and rights for another, not a “progressive realization.” 
The detaching of the rights dialogue from a legal interest-balancing or social contract 
approach is also seen in the activities of the U.N. agency, UNIFEM.54 The original treaties 
establish a goal of “gender equality” and “mainstreaming” rather than the promotion of a single 
gender. This fits with a concept of balancing of power and contracting between genders for the 
benefit of both genders that is the goal of international treaties. But that is not how these “rights” 
are now viewed in U.N. applications. The goal is now to promote benefits, rather than equity, and 
to deliver them to women, without considering the implications of the overall system.55 Thus, both 
the goals and measures are distorted together. 
 
Why the International System Cannot Solve the Problem Itself 
 
The confusion that the U.N. system has introduced into concepts and measurement of 
human rights, now also distorts the approaches of academics and activists. This is a result of 
features inherent in the U.N. system today as well as in global relations. As noted, some of the 
contradictions in the way the U.N. conceptualizes rights are built into the logic of the U.N. as an 
organization, without any direct accountability to the world’s cultures or its citizens.  Even so, in 
drafting rights treaties, parties to the U.N. were aware of this contradiction, and were in fact trying 
to prevent the tragedies they knew were the result of internal repressions of minority cultures and 
individuals within them. Their goal was to build a system to hold these tendencies in check. 
However, it seems that they have failed. In fact, many changes in the international system since 
World War II have subverted many U.N. goals and replaced the post-World War II consensus with 
much of the same colonial agenda that led to World War II, and the need for establishing the U.N. 
system and its protections in the first place. The global system continues to be one of competing 
                                                 
53 Id. at 34. 
54 Note that UNIFEM, (now known as “U.N. Women”), works in one of the few rights areas (“rights of women”) 
found in international rights treaties.   
55 See David Lempert, An Accountability Indicator for Gender Equality Projects of NGOs and International 
Organizations, 2 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 2 (2016). 
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empires as well as of new “neo-colonial” blocs in a system of globalization that has much of the 
same dependencies and centralized power of elites as before World War II. 
As an organization of State parties, the U.N. system has a natural proclivity to represent 
international elites and their militaries, and to seek to maintain existing arrangements of power in 
nation-states without transferring any real power to cultural minorities or to citizens, in general. 
The approach of States and elites seeking to maintain their power is to control their minorities, not 
to empower them. Their concept of rights is something to be “bestowed,” not something that they 
would ordinarily seek to achieve in the interests of “progress” or humanity.  Indeed, the history of 
European diplomacy is one of kings, emissaries, and generals, not a democratically based 
interaction of citizens.   
There are three other social phenomena that seem to be affecting the international system 
today in how it treats rights. First, the major powers in the international system are empires. Thus, 
the approach to globalization that has reasserted itself in the international system is one of 
colonialism (neo-colonialism). This is largely a single system. Accordingly, its ideology remains 
one of “economic growth” through industrialization and assimilation of minority cultures and 
peoples into this single system.56 The U.N. Development Programme, the World Bank and 
governments have colluded to generate a set of “basic needs” and “development goals” that push 
countries to sell their resources, assimilate their cultures into the global system, and accept foreign 
investments in new technologies in order to acquire quick cash to increase consumption of the 
poor and to call it an expansion of “rights.” 
The one “human right” that seems to have gained the most attention is improving the status 
of women. This is indicative of the overall failure of the contemporary human rights system. The 
approach of promoting women’s rights as the single priority for human rights fits directly with 
corporate goals for labor exploitation and for industrializing cultures.57 The Soviet Union used this 
same focus on women in the Muslim cultures of its empire, dating back to the 1930s, when it 
sought a strategy to quickly industrialize and assimilate them in a way that would break the local 
cultures.58 The international system may now be doing the same. 
Second, the end of the Cold War increased the participation of “Second World” countries 
of the former Soviet Russian Empire and China, and the citizens of their empires in the U.N. 
General Assembly and the staffs of its agencies. The traditions in these countries were largely 
authoritarian and not based on citizen oversight or “social contract.” Therefore, their concepts of 
“rights” were largely of “economic” transfers of “social benefits” to legitimize the government. 
This approach now increasingly permeates the international system in its focus on rights in a 
“convergence” to lower rather than higher standards of rights based on balancing of political 
power.59 
                                                 
56 See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER. 
THE CAPITALIST WORLD ECONOMY (1979). 
57 See BROOKS DUNCAN, Every Woman for Himself: A Male Feminist Reconsiders, in ANTHROPOLOGY IN 
ACTION 61-64 (Sept./Oct. 2 011), 
http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/berghahn/0967201x/v18n3/s7.pdf?expires=1329548817&id=6
7275992&titleid=75002101&accname=Guest+User&checksum=61639915ADD AA9FE1C0B742C1088CB63.  
58 See GREGORY MASSELL, THE SURROGATE PROLETARIAT: MOSLEM WOMEN AND REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES 
(1974). 
59 See Brooks Duncan, Convergence Theory Revisited: Kafkaesque Global Bureaucracies of Our Times: With an 
Example of a Tool for Measuring Whether Approaches to Accountability a Real or Sham, 13 SOCIAL EVOLUTION 
AND HISTORY 1, 67-98 (Mar. 2014). 
 
37
Lempert: Measuring “Progress” and “Regress” in Human Rights: Why We Need a
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2017
MEASURING “PROGRESS” AND “REGRESS” IN HUMAN RIGHTS 38 
 
Third, the international system bureaucracy has now become a fixture of contemporary 
life. Additionally, this bureaucracy works to promote its own corporate interests in ways that create 
a conflict of interest with its actual legal mandate. Moreover, given certain sovereign immunities, 
it is also under very little oversight. The way it promotes itself is to look for ways to generate work 
and to handle increasing transfer of funds, while ingratiating itself with existing systems of power. 
Its corporate interest is to define rights in terms of economic benefits and to assign itself the tasks 
of managing these economic transfers. Its constituencies are other bureaucrats in member states 
who receive funds, as well as those who have an interest in serving as an intermediary of those 
funds, rather than confronting existing powers to push them to share their power and restructure 
their systems. The international bureaucrats have worked to justify their agenda by linking it with 
fundraising appeals like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) which also now work to promote the interests of “growth” and 
“globalization” rather than the U.N. system’s actual legal agenda for development or rights.60 They 
have also earned academic credibility from economists who redefine “development” transfers as 
“rights.”61  
Part of the focus on “signing international treaties” (but not fulfilling them in any 
meaningful way) as a measure of “rights” may also have emerged because this furthers the self-
interest of international rights bureaucrats. It is as if so-called rights professionals have now created 
a “treaty business” where they generate new treaties and then latch onto funds for promoting them 
in “awareness campaigns” and workshops. For example, some of this has happened with the recent 
declaration on “Human Rights Education” which many human rights organizations promoted and 
that they now use for fundraising appeals.62 
By redefining human rights as a social policy rather than a legal power balance, the 
potential list of rights now becomes infinite as does the call for more treaties to promote them. 
What will prevent the “right to pickled herring” or to gefilte fish from being added to the list, along 
with television sets and automobiles in the “progressive realization” of rights? What will stop 
specific industries from promoting them to gain a share of the benefits? 
                                                 
60 See DAVID LEMPERT, TESTING THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY’S SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGS) 
AGAINST PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (on file with author). 
61 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
62 David Lempert, A Human Rights Education Project Indicator for NGOs and International Organizations, 3 
INTERAMERICAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY 1 (2010).   
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D. Existing Measurement Approaches and Their Limitations 
 
The confusion that the U.N. system has created in mis-defining the international consensus 
and professional standards on human rights is also reflected in the existing measurement 
approaches both inside and outside the U.N. itself. Oftentimes, the idea of measurement and 
objectivity are challenged and an attempt at measurement has not even begun. There do not appear 
to be any structural indicators to fit the concept of enforceable rights through a social contract nor 
are there any outcome indicators measuring power balances. The three main general indicators in 
the field are measures of symptoms of abuse rather than the actual outcome goal of power 
balancing. Other general indicators of “democracy and governance” that include human rights 
categories do look at structures, but these are generally “conformity” indicators to measure the 
copying of certain existing models that are assumed to be “democratic” or protective of rights, 
without any real measures of whether they are in fulfillment of underlying rights principles. Most 
human rights indicators that exist today do measure single outcomes. Most of these are really social 
policy outcome indicators which are fit into the category of human rights, or measures of human 
rights violations and abuses.   
 
General Approaches to Measurement of Human Rights 
 
Although the U.N. system recognizes that its 70 years of treaties on human rights create an 
obligation for measures to “monitor and report on the progress made towards the realization of the 
human rights set out in the core [of] international human rights,”63 it was only recently that the 
U.N. began to even discuss indicators and what they should measure. Several authors within the 
U.N. or at the World Bank, have found very little in general on “human rights based approaches” 
to programming, or on specific areas.64 
The few indicators that they have found are those of social policy that are really human 
development indicators, or “performance” indicators, on the transfer of benefits that are not the 
core of “rights.” Others have found some sociological approaches to equality that are easy to 
compile such as comparisons of genders,65 agreements to sign treaties and reports on violations of 
rights.66 The U.N. system sheepishly acknowledges that the existing measures essentially fall into 
the two categories of measurement of social benefits and measurement of rights violations, 
describing the emergence of these two tracks as a result of “historical reasons and, perhaps, for the 
                                                 
63 See supra note 13, at 13. 
64 See K.A. BOLLEN, Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures, 
1950 to 1984 in HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATISTICS (T.B. Jabine and R. Pierre Claude, eds.,1992); see also 
Governance Indicators: A Users Guide, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (2004), 
http://gaportal.org/sites/default/files/undp_users_guide_online_version.pdf; see also Todd Landman, Indicators for 
Human Rights Based Approaches to Development in UNDP Programming: A Users’ Guide, UNITED NATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME OSLO GOVERNANCE CENTRE (2006); see also R. Malhotra and N. Fasel, 
QUANTITATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS: A SURVEY OF MAJOR INITIATIVE, NORDIC NETWORK SEMINAR IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH (Mar. 10-13, 2005), 
http://www.gaportal.org/sites/default/files/Quantitative%20Human%20Rights%20Indicators.pdf; see also Siobhán 
McInerney-Lankford, and Hans-Otto Sano, Human Rights Indicators in Development – An Introduction, WORLD 
BANK (2010). 
 
65 See UNCT [Sandra Pellagrom], Performance Indicators for Gender Equality (2008). 
66 See supra note 13, at 23. 
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sake of analytical convenience.”67 They acknowledge that “[t]his has contributed to an artificial 
dichotomy that is neither desirable nor tenable in the face of the indivisibility and interdependence 
of all human rights.”68   
In short, there is no measure of the overall outcome goals for rights categories such as 
political equality, social equality, improved oversight, citizen control of various categories of 
institutions, survival and health of cultures/communities in maintaining their diversity, and 
expansion of individual opportunity and freedoms. Nor are there measures of the specific structural 
social contract mechanisms that are essential to bringing about these outcomes. The focus remains 
on the individual rights themselves, as if each stated right is both a structure and an outcome goal. 
This confusion is directly reflected in how the U.N. system now looks for measures of “the 
enjoyment of rights by rights holders; in other words, capturing a few outcomes that could be 
related to the state of realization of human rights.”69 Admittedly, the U.N. system does not know 
what this directive means, which explains why they end up with measures like “literacy rates” as 
indicators of human rights. 
Meanwhile, the general indicators that have been developed have earned little respect or 
support from human rights activists. Many attempts to create indicators of rights and democracy, 
like those of Freedom House or others linked to the U.S. government, have justifiably been 
attacked for biases in seeking to promote U.S. political interests.70 Given these biases, there has 
been a movement to eliminate measurements entirely, viewing attempts at measurement to be more 
harmful than good, and guaranteeing no standard or ability to “progress” at all. In the early 20th 
century, when the Russians ended their monarchy and established “Soviet” rule, their argument on 
measures was much the same as the one being used now, as voiced by legal scholar Pashukanis.71 
To eliminate injustices, the Russians sought to eliminate lawyers as well as the overall legal 
system, and replace it with mass mob rule, summary judgments and edicts. The argument was that 
law was subservient to power, and that eliminating power differences required eliminating the 
institutions that came with it. Today, the argument is that racism, slavery, patriarchy, imperialism, 
theft and indentured servitude were all perpetuated by a system of law, institutional measurement, 
and force of contract. Rather than measure equality and its sources, as well as use systems and 
measures to set new goals and corrective measures, there is an attack on the validity and ideology 
of measurement itself. 
 
The Three Leading Attempts at Political Rights Indicators 
 
There are three indicators that deal directly with measuring clusters of rights: the CIRI 
Indicator, the Freedom House Indicator and the Humana Index that directly uses the ICCPR as the 
basis for constructing a measure. All of them appear to have the same underlying flaw of measuring 
individual trees (either symptoms of inequalities or appearance of legal institutions or promises) 
rather than looking at the overall forest (the overall balance of power and the ways they are 
guaranteed). 
                                                 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 28.  
70 NOAM CHOMSKY AND EDWARD HERMAN, THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM 
(1979); see also TONY EVANS, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); see also SAVIC OBRAD, THE POLITICS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). 
71 See EVGENII V.  PASHUKANIS.  LAW AND MARXISM:  A GENERAL THEORY.  (Barbara Einhorn, trans., 1978). 
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It is simple to understand why these kinds of measurements are flawed. Often now with a wink 
from U.N. agencies, contemporary political systems know how to create the appearance of rights 
protections and to create a facade of legality without substance in ways that meet the U.N.’s test 
of “progressive realization” and “policy commitments” to rights that are little more than public 
relations. Almost every country has signed rights declarations, has constitutions that enshrine these 
protections within them,72 and has the institutional mechanisms that create the appearance of 
democracy. This includes elections and separation of powers. The problem is that there is a “deep 
structure” of how power really works, through economic, military and institutional and social 
linkages. Without examining this “deep structure” of power, the outer institutional frameworks are 
essentially meaningless. 
Similarly, the measure of human rights violations may in fact be only a measure of the type 
of control system that a society uses, rather than a measure of its depth of control and suppression 
of rights. Police states do not need to use force if they can destroy dissent through more subtle 
means.73 The Soviet Union of 1936, under Stalin and his Constitution, of 1956, the period of Sergei 
Khruschev’s Secret Speech denouncing Stalin and of the “Khruschev Thaw”, and 1976, the 
beginning of the Leonid Brezhenev era (and new, 1977 Constitution) were essentially the same 
system. However, violations were fewer over time because people were resigned to control.74 
Another common flaw characterizes these indicators as those like the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the international 
system. The measures start out with the assumption that the groups initiating the measurement 
represent the high point of civilization and offer a model for other societies to follow. The 
measuring countries are given the highest score or top rank. The assumption here is that civilization 
is already at a dead end and that “progress” simply means conformity with the leader. Thus, there 
is no vision for future improvement because there is no real measure of any real standard. See 
below for other examples used today  
 
The Freedom House Indicator 
 
Though Freedom House has two indicators, one about “free” individuals and another on 
“press freedom,” the measures are limited to individual rights. Additionally, the measures are 
derived from conformity to the existence of certain institutions found in U.S. and Western 
societies.  They do not look at deep structure or power balances.75 
Freedom House is a U.S. government-funded, politically established organization dating 
back to 1941, whose ratings are now used by the Millennium Challenge Corporation as the basis 
for U.S. government interventions in weaker countries. Its indicator aggregates several sub-
measures; combining, for example, sub-categories of “political rights” and “civil liberties” based 
on measures of structures and processes, without any direct measure of power imbalances or how 
                                                 
72 Indeed, so did Stalin’s 1936 Constitution in the Soviet Union that he claimed was the most progressive of its era.   
73 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:  THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1985). 
74 See ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE U.S.S.R.:  A GUIDE TO THE SOVIET 
CONSTITUTIONS (London: Metheun Publishing (1981)); see also Fainsod and Hough, infra. 
75 See Freedom in the World, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world; see also, 
Methodology, FREEDOM HOUSE (2006), https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-
2006/methodology?page=352&ana_page=330&year=2006.  
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the relative balances fit into culturally sustainable protections. Freedom House measures seven 
major categories: (1) electoral process; (2) civil society; (3) independent media; (4) national 
democratic governance; (5) local democratic governance; (6) judicial framework and 
independence; and (7) corruption.76 It then provides a composite score of how “democratic” a 
country is overall. 
 
 Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project   
 
The CIRI Indicator mostly measures human rights violations, using annual data from the 
U.S. State Department and Amnesty International monitoring, making it more of a political fear 
index than an index of human rights itself.77    
The index has tabulated data for 202 countries since 1981 and places them in categories of 
“Physical Integrity Rights” (symptoms of political repression such as torture, disappearance, and 
political imprisonment among others) and “Empowerment Rights,” which is really a list of 
government statements on its own restrictions, coming from the list of human rights treaty 
aspirations (freedom of speech, freedom of religion) as well as some other categories. There are 
also sociological measures of gender equality and the standard measure of institutional pluralism 
within government that is measured by the existence of an “independent” judiciary.78 
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Rights List 
 
This country ranking is essentially a measure of conformity with the specific list of 
aspirations in human rights treaties for individual rights and does not go deeper than this. 
Charles Humana has compiled the rankings since 1985 with the goal of measuring 
international compliance with the 1966 ICCPR. Humana’s list includes 40 measures, among them: 
“democratic elections,” “freedom of speech,” “independence of courts,” and incidence of torture.79   
Like the other indices, freedom of speech examines government repression but not at 
equality of access to media. Independence of courts is not a measure of citizen access to juries or 
equality of courts but only of institutional pluralism. Measures of electoral processes do not 
examine the ability to form or influence parties and legislation.   
 
“Good Governance” or “Democracy” Indicators   
 
There are many more generalized indicators of “governance” and “democracy” than there 
are for human rights. Although these indicators overlap with rights indicators and include some 
rights measures, their goal is often to promote political agendas to fit countries into the global 
system rather than to promote rights structures or outcomes. They are not particularly relevant to 
                                                 
76 See Freedom in the World, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world; see also, 
Methodology, FREEDOM HOUSE (2006), https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-
2006/methodology?page=352&ana_page=330&year=2006. 
77 See David Cingranelli, et al., Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project (2014), 
www.humanrightsdata.com. 
78 Note that all three of the major rights measurement organizations seem to use the Freedom House indicator yet 
none measure the power of citizen juries and of citizen ability to make challenges and to win against institutional 
power in the legal system. 
79 See CHARLES HUMANA, WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE (1992). 
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the measurement of rights. Nevertheless, they offer some context to the overall political pressures 
and blinders on indicators that deal with political systems. The indicators fall into two main 
categories: (1) general measures of democracy and governance that are either used by academics 
or by government agencies for setting policy, and (2) aid agency indicators to guide specific policy 
interventions.80 
Most of the political science indicators of democracy or governance try to offer an overall 
country measure in one or a few dimensions, like the Freedom House or CIRI indicator, but they 
are not usable as measures of progress or regress on “rights.” By contrast, development 
organizations offer long checklists on dozens of project categories that are not standardized 
according to impacts on the goals of democracy. Overall, current indicators are really more like 
diagnostics measuring the existence of particular features of governance that might or might not 
have any significance in terms of the ends of democracy and that are not linked to those ends.  
Political scientists have created at least nine established indicators that they use as a basis 
for regression analyses for country comparisons.81  Almost all of these indicators generate 
aggregate measures (e.g., “competitiveness of participation”) that have no direct measurable link 
to power imbalances and rights.  Political scientists, living and working in industrial settings, focus 
on “state” and political institutions and processes in industrial societies as a model. Like the three 
human rights indicators described above, the political science indicators of democracy and 
governance measure rights violations that are symptoms of inequalities (torture, imprisonment, 
shutting of newspapers) and offer lists of inputs (e.g., increased number of courthouses) that may 
address those symptoms and that lack a direct relation to underlying power imbalances and 
inequities. None offer an indicator that can be used for all types of societies, including traditional 
cultures or even ancient Greece and colonial America, where “democratic” institutions lacked the 
institutional features of contemporary State systems. 
Among some of the better-known indicators of international organizations and political 
scientists described briefly, are those of three international organizations: (1) the World Bank, (2) 
USAID and (3) the European Union (EU).  
 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
The World Bank’s governance indicator completely avoids mention of “rights” since the 
Bank’s real “development” concern is “governance,” as defined in terms of ability to manage 
international loans in a stable way. The World Bank aggregates data from 30 organizations with 
measures including: “voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.”82 Many of the measures are perceptual, 
and they have a selective bias against small minorities and in favor of majority rule (tyranny of the 
majority). This is in opposition to the established principles of the international community for 
democracy as a balance of power that would protect cultural and individual rights.83 
 
                                                 
80 See David Lempert, A ‘Democracy Building’ Development Project Indicator for NGOs and International 
Organizations, 11 GLOBAL JURIST 2 (2011). 
81 See Gerardo L.  Munck and Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating 
Alternative Indices, 35 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 1 (2002). 
 
82  See Daniel Kaufmann, et al., Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-
2006, THE WORLD BANK (2007). 
83 Id. at 30.  
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USAID Democracy and Governance Indicators  
 
USAID has a set of indicators for its Democracy and Governance programs that go beyond 
the Freedom House score and that are geared to measure “performance.”84 USAID bureaucrats 
have compiled 200 pages of logistical frameworks (called logframes) that send every kind of 
democracy and governance project, including those in human rights, to a different sub-category. 
These include the “rule of law and respect for human rights,” “genuine and competitive political 
processes,” “politically active civil society” and “accountable and transparent government 
institutions.”85  The measures they offer as outputs are often indistinguishable from inputs and 
have little validity, such as “[n]umber of new courts opened in rural and urban areas with 
concentrations of marginalized populations” as a measure of “equal access” to justice.86 The 
implication of these measures is that the real goal of “democratization” is not to follow 
international rights principles but to industrialize societies and destroy their traditions in order to 
fulfill other USAID sub-goals that are presented simultaneously, such as: “Support a Market Based 
Economy.”87   
 
European Union (European Commission (EC), European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), Council of Europe (CoE)) 
 
The European Union has not progressed in constructing any indicators, though they held a 
conference in 2002 and have published some guidelines that are mostly in the form of diagnostics 
of problems to be addressed.88 
 
Among those developed by political scientists are these four: (1) Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, (2) Polity IV, (3) Polyarchy 1.2 and (4) the Economist magazine.  
 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
 
This is an example of a governance index that measures goals of economic transformation 
(“governance for growth”) and of “political management of change on the way to a market based 
                                                 
84 See Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE (1998), 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacc390.pdf. 
85 Id. at 17, 57, 115 and 151.  
86 Id. at 35.  
87  Although the wording “market based economy” has been disappearing from USAID documents, the approach has 
not changed. See MILJA KURKI, DEMOCRATIC FUTURES:  REVISIONING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION at 135 (2013).  
88  See MEASURING DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONFERENCE, 
(Jan. 21-23, 2002), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/46346/48072/cdg-munich-centre.pdf/458d8012-a24d-
451e-8c88-184912870821; see also, THE E.U.'S ROLE IN PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN 
THIRD COUNTRIES, COMMISSION OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES,  COMMUNICATION  FROM  THE  COMMISSION  
TO  THE  COUNCIL  AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (May 8, 2001), http://aei.pitt.edu/37812/; see also HANDBOOK ON 
PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION EUROPEAN 
AID COOPERATION OFFICE, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/handbook-promoting-good-governance-ec-development-
and-co-operation_en.  
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democracy” that are in direct odds with human rights goals.89 The index looks at five subjective 
categories: “stateness,” “political participation,” “rule of law,” “stability of democratic 
institutions,” “political and social integration” – e.g. “political party system,” and “extent” to 
which “democratic institutions [are] capable of performing.”90   
 
Polity IV 
 
This is a ranking index of countries, using a set of 21 points for “autocracy” and 
“democracy” combined measures.  It focuses on the governing authority and its processes but not 
on power imbalances in typical stratification categories for rights protection like class, gender, 
ethnicity/religion/nationality.91 
 
Polyarchy 1.2 
 
This data set offers only the process measures of “competitiveness and political 
participation.”92    
 
The Economist 
 
The Economist magazine uses an “index of democracy” based on five categories. These 
categories include: (1) free and fair election process, (2) civil liberties, (3) functioning of 
government, (4) political participation and (5) political culture.93 Additionally, the index has 60 
questions including attempts to measure “capability of civil servants to implement policies” that 
are often unrelated to rights protections and could just as well be used to measure the efficiency of 
a dictatorship.94 
 
E. Proposed Indicator:  Process Measures by Area and Related Outcome Measures 
 
There is currently no prospect for the creation of a single indicator for the measurement of 
progress (or regress) in human rights, but it is possible now to identify the specific categories of 
power balances and social contract rights that should be measured and to note the kinds of 
measures that can be used (where they now exist) or invented. 
Most of the measures (some 20+ potential measures) rely on measures of power balancing and 
influence (political science measures), sociological impacts (equity) and cultural sustainability 
(anthropology measures). While these social science fields have partly started to work towards 
                                                 
89See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX 2006:  POLITICAL MANAGEMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 10 (2006),  http://bti2006.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/fileadmin/pdf/BTI_2006_Brosch_re_GB.pdf. 
90 Id.   
91 See Monty Marshall et al., POLITY IV PROJECT: POLITICAL REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND    TRANSITIONS, 1800-
2006 (2006), http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
92 See T. Vanhanen, A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998, 37 Journal of Peace Research 251-
265 (2000). 
93 See Laza Kekic, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy, THE ECONOMIST (2007), 
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf. 
94 Id.  
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creating the measurements, they seem to have shown little interest to date in doing so. Though 
there may be practical problems in creating some of these measures and in updating them to reflect 
technological and social changes that influence power balances and oversight, these challenges 
appear to be easier to overcome than the ideological unwillingness to seek measurements. 
 
Categories of Measures and Consistency with Rights Approaches  
 
In the absence of existing categories for appropriate measures of human rights, the 
approach here is to start with the international consensus on aspirations that forms the basis for 
“development” and “rights” (Table 4) and to then look for the various social contract power 
balancing categories necessary to achieve them. This appears to offer a useful guiding framework 
for existing and potential social science measures in some clear human rights categories. 
Table 6 starts with the 13 categories I have found in international treaties to comprise a set 
of “universal development goals.” These goals all have human rights correlatives, as have been 
presented in Table 4. Here in Table 6, the human rights that fit the 13 categories can be presented 
in terms of the key elements of human rights: social contract mechanisms (for balances of power 
and asserting the groups to be protected, that are generally measured by political science) that are 
shown in the middle column, and outcome measures (generally measured by sociology or 
anthropology in terms of equality or sustainability) shown in the third column.  
Note that the universal development goals were already divided into four levels: the 
individual level (analogous to individual rights in terms of opportunity but also including some 
protections for cultures/communities in the development of individuals as members of those 
cultures), the societal level (analogous to the power balancing of individuals), the cultural and 
community level goal of sustainability (the goal of cultural rights) and the global level (analogous 
to cultural and community rights). These four categories reflect the two levels of rights (individual 
and community) and differentiate between guarantees of opportunity for individuals and power 
balances in the social contract to protect individuals. The approach also widens the goal of rights 
to social contract in the international system and not just within states and lower levels of political 
power within states. Additionally, note that the different categorical goals of social equity and 
peace at the two different levels are really outcome goals, as equity and peace are outcomes rather 
than structures. Even though human rights treaties include those for “social and economic rights,” 
these treaties really present goals. By contrast, political rights, with the goal of achieving political 
equality, focus directly on structural social contract mechanisms for power balancing, pointing 
directly to the sources of power and the means of controlling them. It is political rights that are 
also the key to achieving social and economic rights and peace. 
The structural social contract mechanisms for achieving political equality require citizen 
contractual rights (for individual equality) and cultural/community contractual rights, usually 
referred to as “federalism” (for cultural/community equality and protection).  The areas that these 
rights work depend on the types of institutional power (military, police, economic and social 
network/social influence) that one finds in a society. This list of categories depends on these 
determinants of power. The table lists several of these areas:  police and the national security state 
(here, considered as one, though they may be more than one), military, corporations, courts 
(decision-making), prosecutors, government administration, non-governmental organizations, and 
media. The social power is reflected in training in civics skills and governance. 
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It is also important to recognize that there are now sources of power that are outside and above 
existing nation states, meaning that social contracting for control over them (such as accountability 
of the United Nations, itself, the World Bank and other global financial institutions, and other 
types of international institutions and power) requires balances of power at a level above the nation 
state. 
Note also that the increasing number of “rights” categories in the international system that 
are simply policy goals, such as governments meeting specific basic needs of individuals, are not 
included in this table. These “policy” goals are not the purpose of “rights.” They are outcomes that 
systems may choose if they have the resources to meet them but they are among an infinite number 
of policy priorities for spending. Earmarking spending at specific levels and priorities is not the 
goal of a rights system. The guiding principles of rights systems that are in the table are those of 
“sustainability” and “equal opportunity” and “equality.” 
While this table does not yet have links to specific measures, it can be used itself as a 
diagnostic of governance systems to see whether or not they are meeting international objectives. 
I have used earlier versions of this approach as a diagnostic tool for evaluating international 
interventions in developing countries in the sector that has been called “democracy, governance 
and human rights.” 
Note again, that the approach here focuses on power balances and not on “violations.” 
Existing indicators seem only able to measure “violations” of rights in terms of individual cases 
of abuse, but they do not focus on inequalities. This makes them easily subject to distortion and 
inflexible to deal with new technologies of control that create imbalances of power. For example, 
contemporary measures of oppression and control are entirely different from that of earlier times 
because they rely on psychological techniques of persuasion and control. There is less of a need 
for overt and violent forms, which are usually those measured today as “violations” of rights. The 
underlying power balance may convince the masses to avoid any form of opposition is avoided. 
This reduces the need for violent controls.95 Contemporary controls in the national security state 
are described as a form of “inverted totalitarianism” of corporatism which is a gentler form of 
fascism different from the rabid nationalist totalitarianism of the German Nazi era or the Russian 
Stalinist era.96 This progression occurred in the Soviet Union after the Stalinist era even though 
the same elites remained in place.97 
Changes in technology and social organization suggest that the categories of measures may 
also need to be re-evaluated systematically. Not only does technology change but the social 
structures of small and large societies differ, with legal institutions, for example, not existing in 
traditional cultures.   
Thomas Jefferson, the leader for American independence in the 18th century, and one of 
the signatories of the U.S. Constitution, claimed that the United States needed a revolution every 
generation as the means of forcing a dissolution of and renegotiation of the social contract.98 He 
                                                 
95 See supra note 74. 
96 See Sheldon Wolin, Illiberal Democracy, THE NATION (May 19, 2003); see also Martin Gilens and Benjamin 
Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 AM. POLI. SCI. 
REVIEW 564 (2016).  
97  See supra note 74.   
98  “[G]od forbid we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion,” wrote Jefferson.  “What country can preserve 
its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance …. The 
tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.”  See Thomas Jefferson 
letter to William Smith, Paris, November 13, 1787, U.S. Library of Congress exhibits, Available at: 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/105.html.   
47
Lempert: Measuring “Progress” and “Regress” in Human Rights: Why We Need a
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2017
MEASURING “PROGRESS” AND “REGRESS” IN HUMAN RIGHTS 48 
recognized the changes in technologies that would change political balances and oversight, as it 
has occurred today particularly in military, surveillance and communications. Other factors that 
would distort and invalidate social contracts could include climate changes and disaster that would 
change balances of powers and resources, scarcity of specific resources, concentration of industry 
and changes in industries, and international events including war (and today, the emergence of 
international organizations and new forms of international power).  
 
Table 6.  Translating Categories for Human Rights Aspirations (“Universal Development Goals”) 
in U.N. Treaties into Measurable Human Rights Categories 
 
1. Individual Development Goals: Individual Rights 
 
 Overall 
Objectives 
Corresponding Human 
Rights Structures (Social 
Contract) 
Corresponding Human 
Rights Outcomes 
1. 
& 
2. 
Individual Rights 
Based Individual 
Development 
[Below] Equal Education and 
Access to Requisites for 
Equal Physical and 
Mental Development 1. Physical (body) 
development:   
2. Mental 
development:   
3. 
to 
6. 
Community 
Rights Based 
Individual 
Development 
Community and family 
control of education and 
socialization 
Contractual protection of 
future rights 
Contractual protection of 
individual child rights 
Reinforcement of all other 
rights through education 
and socialization 
3. Spiritual 
(appreciation of 
natural world) 
development:   
Sustainability (Protection 
of Nature) 
4. Moral 
(appreciation of 
others as 
individuals) 
development:   
Equal rights and due 
process 
5. Social 
(appreciation of 
community) 
development:   
Community sustainability 
6. Cultural 
(appreciation of 
one’s identity) 
development:   
Cultural Sustainability 
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2. Societal Level Development Goals   
 
 Overall 
Objectives 
Corresponding Human 
Rights Structures (Social 
Contract) 
Corresponding Human 
Rights Outcomes 
7. Social equity/ 
Social progress/ 
Equal opportunity 
for individuals   
[See Political Guarantees 
of Rights, Below] 
Economic Equality; 
Equal Opportunity in 
Education, with 
elimination of 
intergenerational wealth 
transfers 
8. Political equity/ 
Equal rights for 
individuals:   
Equal Access to Courts 
Equal Access to Media 
Equal Training in Civics 
Skills/ Governance  
Justice System Oversight 
Prosecutorial Oversight 
Police and National 
Security State Oversight 
Military Oversight 
Government 
Administration Oversight 
Corporate Institutions 
Oversight 
Other Non-Governmental 
Organization Oversight 
[All of these at both the 
nation-state and 
international levels] 
Equal Rights/ Due 
Process 
Equal opportunity in 
Political Access and 
oversight; 
9. Peace/ Tolerance/ 
De-militarization 
for individuals:   
[Same as Above] [Same as Above] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Cultural/ Community Level Goals 
 
 Overall 
Objectives 
Corresponding Human 
Rights Structures (Social 
Contract) 
Corresponding Human 
Rights Outcomes 
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10.  Sustainability/ 
(sovereignty) of 
cultures:   
[Political Rights of 
Federalism, Below] 
Cultural Sustainability 
and Sovereignty; 
Federalism 
 
 
4. Global Development Goals 
 
 Overall 
Objectives 
Corresponding Human 
Rights Structures (Social 
Contract) 
Corresponding Human 
Rights Outcomes 
11.  Social equity/ 
Social progress/ 
Equal 
opportunity of 
cultures:   
[See Political Equity, 
Below] 
Cultural and community 
sustainability and 
sovereignty  
12.  Political equity/ 
Equal rights for 
cultures:   
Federalism and Self-
Determination 
Justice System Oversight/ 
Balancing 
Executive Power 
Oversight/ Balancing 
Legislative Power 
Oversight/ Balancing 
Military Oversight/ 
Balancing/ Self-Defense 
[All of these at both the 
nation-state and 
international levels] 
Federalism and Self 
Determination (Political 
equity, equal rights, but 
not homogenization and 
not equality of condition), 
within countries and 
internationally 
13.  Peace/ 
Tolerance/ De-
militarization for 
protection of 
cultures:   
[Same as Above]  [Same as Above] 
 
 
 
Types of Specific Measures  
 
Given a list of specific categories for human rights, there should be a corresponding 
measure for each category. Some such measures already exist and it is at least possible to identify 
the type of tools that might be used to generate measures in the other categories where measures 
do not currently exist. 
Table 7 takes the categorical information from Table 6 and translates it directly into specific 
areas of outcome measures. The table preserves the distinction between structural social contract 
measures that have the goal of political equality or equal opportunity at the individual or 
cultural/community level and those of outcome measures. The table preserves the levels of 
50
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol10/iss2/5
DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 51 
individual and cultural rights and the distinction between political equality and opportunity. 
Overall, there are 21 rows corresponding to 16 outcomes of measures at the level of individual 
rights, and 5 at the level of cultural/community rights. Additionally, there are two general outcome 
measures: one for cultural sustainability at the level of culture/community and one, for general 
equality, at the level of the individual. Two general measures do exist, though the one at the 
individual level that currently exists (the measure of wealth distribution using either the Gini 
coefficient or Theil index) is just a proxy measure since it measures wealth, and not all dimensions 
of equality. However, the one at the cultural level, that of the “Red Book for Endangered Cultures,” 
is one that also exists in proxy (endangered languages) but is not widely used.99  
While Table 7 identifies the areas of measures, most of these measures do not currently 
exist. Many social scientists will likely suggest that they are too difficult to develop, or if they can 
be developed, they would be more complex than suggested by Table 7.  
Several of the indicators are for balances of power. Since the Gini coefficient and Theil 
index already exist for certain measurable variables, like wealth and income, it should be 
theoretically possible to find measures of political power. One area of power balance, for example, 
is military power of cultural groups to protect their resources. Military analysts routinely do this 
to determine their own vulnerabilities, and that such measures could be adopted for use in 
measuring the power of minority cultures and communities if they have not been used already. 
These measures may now exist in secret, used by state institutions for perpetuating inequalities in 
plans for warfare and social control.  However, they may be possible to create using measures of 
power, if power can be converted to single units in the same way as income and wealth. Both the 
Gini coefficient and the Theil index show how far distributions of holdings of a resource are either 
inequitable or diverge from a random distribution. Because there is a history of modern arms 
treaties as well as cease fire agreements between militaries, that means that there is a basis for 
analyzing power differences and convertibility of different forms of power.  Note again that the 
idea is to create measures of countervailing power itself, rather than just the existence of specific 
institutions that can be thwarted (like “separation of powers”) or measures of symptoms (like 
numbers of political detainees).   
The literature on democratic theory and power does not yet appear to be so well developed, 
but there has been some attempt to demonstrate how different political resources have translated 
into power.100 
Sociologists routinely examine social equality for various groups like women and 
minorities in terms of income. There should be mathematical methods for aggregating different 
group inequalities into a single measure using incomes, as well as to find similar measures for 
power. 
Political scientists have already been measuring “dependency” through economic influence 
of trade flows that are unequal. There are also existing political science measures of “oligarchy” 
and “democracy” that measure influence over different spheres of political decision-making and 
influence. There seem to be measures of economic control over means of production or key 
infrastructure like energy and telecommunications that already suggest how “vulnerable” a system 
is to shock and that should translate into corollaries for distribution of power. 
Measurement categories should generally work across cultures with similar technologies 
and social complexity. These balances are now generally universal, given that the models of 
contemporary states/societies are essentially that of a mixture of common elements but in different 
                                                 
99 See DUNCAN, supra note 57. 
100 See ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961). 
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proportions. The “new industrial state” and its “mixed economies” simply offer different roles and 
boundaries for military, police, corporate power, security state and other kinds of institutions.101 
                                                 
101 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); see also CHARLES LINDBLOM. POLITICS 
AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977).  
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Table 7.  Sets of Indicators for Systematic Human Rights Achievement (Domestic, assuming no 
international interference) 
 
Area of Power 
Balancing 
Structural Social Contract 
Mechanisms 
Outcome Indicator 
Individual Rights 
(16 total categories 
in two sub-areas) 
Participatory Democracy and 
Oversight 
[Gini Coefficient or Theil 
Index as a Proxy 
Measure; Political 
science measure of public 
influence on areas of 
decisions based on 
individual 
characteristics] [Exists] 
Equal Opportunity 
(General)/ Equal 
Starting Position 
(political capital) 
(8 categories) 
Equal Education and Access to 
Requisites for Equal Physical 
and Mental Development, with 
elimination of intergenerational 
wealth transfers 
Gini Coefficient or Theil 
Index on education, with 
modifications for cultural 
difference [Possible] 
 Equal Education in Civic and 
Political/Participatory Skills 
Sociological measure of 
participation and 
influence by background 
[Possible] 
 Community and Family Control 
of education and socialization 
[Needs to be invented] 
 Contractual protection of 
individual child rights 
[Needs to be invented] 
 Contractual protection of future 
rights 
National and community 
asset accounting 
[Possible] 
 Equal Access to Courts Sociological measure of 
participation and 
influence by background 
[Possible] 
 Equal Rights Sociological equity 
measures of incomes, 
controlled for cultural 
choice [Possible] 
 Equal access to media/ Common 
Carrier 
Sociological equity 
measures of media access 
[Possible] 
Political Equality 
Categories (7 
national categories, 
1 international) 
Control Over and Participation 
in all forms of institutional 
power 
Composite Political 
Equity Indicator [Needs 
to be invented] 
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Justice System 
Oversight 
Jury System with nullification 
power; Equal access to attorneys 
in civil and criminal cases 
Sociological Equity 
Measures of Justice 
system at levels of access 
and decision-making  
[Needs to be invented] 
Prosecutorial 
Oversight 
Private Attorneys General; 
Grand Juries 
[Needs to be invented] 
Police and National 
Security State 
Oversight 
Access to technology as a 
counter to state monopoly of 
power; Citizen oversight panels; 
with Free Press/equal access and 
Justice System Oversight and 
Contract Language on Internal 
Rights Protections 
Police Power Equity 
Measures (Police) [Needs 
to be invented] 
Military Oversight Same as above Military Power Equity 
Measures (Military) 
[Needs to be invented] 
Government 
Administration 
Oversight 
Same as above [Needs to be invented] 
Corporate 
Institutions 
Oversight 
Same as above [Needs to be invented] 
Other Non-
government 
organization 
oversight 
Same as above [Needs to be invented] 
Individual 
oversight of 
international 
organizations 
Due Process and Law Suits 
against International 
Organizations; 
Citizen oversight panels 
[Needs to be invented] 
Cultures/Communi
ties Rights (4 
national 
categories, 1 
international) 
Federalism Cultural Survival 
(Cultural Red Book 
Indicator) [a Cultural 
Sustainability Indicator]; 
Community Sustainability 
Indicator [Exists] 
Justice System 
Oversight 
Cultural Court Balancing Sociological measure of 
participation and 
influence by background 
[Possible] 
Executive Power 
Oversight 
Executive Balancing in 
Positions, Selection, Oversight 
Sociological measure of 
participation and 
influence by background 
[Possible] 
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Legislative Power 
Oversight 
Legislative Balancing in 
Positions, Selection, Oversight 
Sociological measure of 
participation and 
influence by background 
[Possible] 
Military Oversight Balancing in Positions, 
Selection, Oversight; Access to 
military technology at the 
community/culture level as a 
counterbalance to centralized 
power 
Military Power Equity 
Measures (Military) 
[Possible] 
International 
System Categories 
Minority Culture Power and 
Oversight in International 
Organizations 
Sociological measure of 
participation and 
influence by background 
[Possible] 
 
 
Difficulties to Overcome  
 
There are no perfect approaches to measures and this list is admittedly spotty. However, 
some of the measurement difficulties can be noted here. 
In trying to measure the relative power of minority cultures, for example, there is an 
immediate question as to whether the measure should be one of “defense” of people and resources 
or balanced offense, and whether it is even possible to measure “security” without including 
calculations for risk, human preference for risk and ability to create a “rational” (rather than a 
paranoid or idiosyncratic) measure of risk. 
Power itself may be difficult to standardize on single dimensions in the same way that 
wealth and income are difficult. Even where economic measures use a numerical standard (such 
as dollars), “value” is still a relative concept subject to changes over time, to original distributions, 
and to paradoxes of interactive impacts of different choices. In the past, countries created balances 
by holding valuable hostages (the King’s favorite daughter) and by creating interdependencies 
(intermarriage among the royal family). How are these networks and loyalties measured in terms 
of balances and threats? 
Where technology has created concentrations of economic productivity and power as well 
as military power (such as in nuclear weapons), how does one calculate relative control and balance 
of this power?  While not everyone can have access to private nuclear weapons, there may be ways 
of balancing access to the launch of existing weapons as deterrents to abuse of power. There may 
be no real balance of power in a nuclear and Orwellian communications technology control age of 
“full spectrum dominance,” unless the technologies of mass annihilation are outlawed or the 
control mechanisms are simultaneously in multiple hands. 
Karl Marx’s belief, that industrial protection could be held in common by citizens all 
controlling the means of production through a “people’s” government, has never seemed to work. 
Individual proprietors with similar investments and technologies can compete and balance power 
but there may or may not actually be a way to balance control of a factory among a community. I 
have suggested various oversight schemes and many are still theorized, but until they are 
confirmed in practice, many of these measures of power are also theoretical. Even if the balance 
can be determined, there are questions of whether the measures themselves may still contain an 
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ideological predisposition to paradoxical solutions.  Is it possible to establish equal power or a 
deterrent for an indigenous culture that still exists on stone tools? Would the establishment of a 
balance of power end up destroying the culture by encouraging them to sell their resources to buy 
weapons?102 
There are also boundary problems. In measuring balance of power, the starting assumption 
is that within a nation-state, one can identify all of the actors and balance their power. But where 
there are foreign hegemonic influences and controls, the measure of power must start at two levels 
at the same time, and the different influences need to be separated at the two different levels. How 
can that be done? 
Once these measures become an art rather than a science, they threaten to lose validity 
rather than to increase it, due to subjectivity, misperception and changing values. This is when the 
critics immediately throw up their hands and claim that measurement cannot be done and, 
therefore, should not be attempted. 
Once the measurement begins to interject subjective judgments for weighting different 
kinds of institutions, it opens the door to the same kind of failures that are found in the CIRI and 
Humana index. The real value of the indicators is in redirecting the thinking so that it is strategic, 
rather than assuring that the measurements are exactly right. Simply by pointing towards balances 
of power and identifying the types of mechanisms and institutions that can be used in social 
contracts to change those balances is a step forward. Many of these mechanisms, like citizen 
inspection panels in business, private attorney generals, equal access to attorneys for civil suits, 
and the use of media as a common carrier are not even discussed in human rights literature today. 
Shifting the focus to mechanisms and social contract is itself a major and valuable change in the 
thinking that would not otherwise occur. 
Measurements are always flawed. The biggest problem may not be the scientific difficulties of 
creating better measures than now exist. The problem may be an ideological one, such as getting 
political scientists and other social scientists to focus on the root causes of rights rather than on 
short term benefits or socially biased measures that work to exert a hegemonic influence, as those 
currently used today. 
 
F. Conclusion:  Solutions   
 
Progress depends on measures. The reluctance of those in the human rights field to seek 
measures that go to the root causes of inequalities and to the desired outcomes has undermined the 
ability to move forward in human rights. 
While it is true that inventing and applying measures is not an easy task, the impediments to 
measures are ideological, not scientific. Several years ago, tI worked to elaborate an outcome 
measure for cultural rights that could have a high impact in the international arena. I publicized it 
to colleagues in international human rights through publication in a major journal and then to 
colleagues in anthropology in the leading practicing anthropology journal. I also publicized the 
approach to colleagues on listserves and sought foundation funding to begin to use these measures. 
I then sought to translate the idea into a form of “certification” that would have a market 
mechanism to promote it, and published the idea again in an anthropology journal. Lastly, I have 
                                                 
102 See David Lempert and Nguyen Nhu Hue, The Global Prisoners’ Dilemma  of Unsustainability: Why 
Sustainable Development Cannot Be Achieved Without Resource Security and Eliminating the Legacies of 
Colonialism, 7 SUSTAINABILITY:  SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY 1 (2011). 
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presented the measure to major international rights organizations like AI. Despite this however, 
the measure remains only on paper but not in practice. 
The existing indicators in human rights that are described in this article are those that 
promote the very ideologies in the international system today that oppose progress in human rights. 
These indicators serve to further hegemonic goals of countries seeking to expand their influence 
by patterning systems in other countries or, in the case of the U.N. system, promote elite interests 
and careers of international “development” bureaucrats. It would be costly for international rights 
NGOs to support the development of the indicators in this article, and it would also be costly to 
apply those that exist.  Increasingly, their funding is also coming from governments and they rely 
on academics, whose funding and goals have similar government or corporate sources. 
Law schools creating human rights programs and courses seem to focus only on lists of 
human rights and memorization of treaties, while supporting the ideology of the U.N. system. A 
university or think tank could easily set up a human rights unit that focuses on measures and applies 
them, like the International Red Book for cultures. Human rights institutes are burgeoning at 
universities today, although few seem interested in measures. Instead, their focuses are on 
philosophy and disputing the idea of measurement, itself. 
The very profession that had the skills to measure cultural survival (anthropology) has 
turned its back on minority cultural survival to focus on narcissistic concerns like “identity” and 
of concerns of individual groups like women and gender minorities. The current approach is to 
assimilate minorities into existing systems of power rather than to measure general inequalities or 
to focus on structural mechanisms for power balancing and rights protections.   
Many “legal studies” and “social justice” programs emerging in the United States do not 
even hire lawyers at all, despite their focus on human rights. Instead, they have written the concept 
of “social contract” and structural mechanisms out of their curriculums and replaced them with 
courses in advocacy, “social movements” and identity. Additionally, such programs have also 
replaced these concepts with courses on individual groups (women, gender minorities, minority 
ethnicities, racial minorities, the disabled, etc.) rather than on structural mechanisms, measures of 
inequality and legal enforcement.103 
While all of these may include sociologists and political scientists, their focus is on 
economic inequality and assimilation as well as on theory, rather than on measures or mechanisms. 
It appears to be by design. Organizations like Amnesty International may now not only be driven 
by corporate and government donors, but 
may be co-dependent on symptoms for their funding. The goals of these organizations appear to 
run continual “campaigns” with no impact on the root causes. 
Perhaps a study of this would conclude that theories on what is possible in achieving rights 
are correct in assuming that rights may be dependent on technologies and environment as a 
dependent variable, rather than something that can change through human choice. While rights 
organizations, international organizations and university programs all claim that they are 
promoting real change, none are able or willing to offer the measures. This suggests that the 
approach to human rights today really is no different than that of religious proselytizing, claiming 
the tools of social science and law, but applying neither. 
 
                                                 
103 If there is an underlying political reason for this, it may be to substitute “religious” invocation and advocacy for 
actual skills to lead to structural change, in a way that offers lip service without any real impact.  Much of the 
funding in human rights, for “advocacy” and “awareness” seems to fall into the same category. 
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For those believing or seeking to prove otherwise, this article offers the basis for taking the next 
step: building and applying specific measures. 
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